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INTRODUCTION
The restrictions on migration that have been imposed by individual countries—and, in recent years, particularly those imposed by
wealthy nations—have contributed significantly to the contemporary
1
problem of international trafficking. Rising restrictions on migration
†

Professor of Law, U.C. Irvine School of Law; J.D., Yale Law School, 1998; A.B.,
Stanford University, 1994. The author wishes to thank Professor Tobias Wolff for his
invitation to participate in this Symposium and Sarah Paoletti, J.J. Rosenbaum, and
Jayashri Srikantiah for their helpful comments during and after our panel discussion.
Thanks also to Dean Erwin Chemerinsky for his support of this research and to Ellen
Augustiniak and Christina Tsou for their research assistance. Finally, thanks to Max
and Jonathan for being such great sports and such fun travelling companions.
1
See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., WORLDS IN MOTION: UNDERSTANDING
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AT THE END OF THE MILLENNIUM 293 (1998) (noting that
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over the past two decades have coincided with unprecedented freedom of movement for goods and capital. The physical movement of
people and goods from one nation to another has never been easier.
But while free trade agreements and technology have facilitated the
flow of goods and money across borders, immigration restrictions
have resulted in more rigid restrictions on the cross-border movement
2
of people. Unsurprisingly, unauthorized migration ensues. This includes both economically motivated migrations and migrations undertaken by individuals fleeing oppression and conflict in their home
countries. Facing waves of refugees and job seekers with new modes
of transportation, the West has moved to raise legal barriers to entry
3
for desperate and vulnerable populations.
These legal barriers are backed up by physical barriers to entry.
In the United States, for example, the build up of border enforcethe restrictions imposed by developed countries have deleterious effects on “individual
rights, civil liberties, and human dignity”); Karen E. Bravo, Exploring the Analogy Between
Modern Trafficking in Humans and the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 207,
295 (2007) [hereinafter Bravo, Exploring] (analogizing the trade-offs between individual states’ border-protection measures and human trafficking harms to trade-offs made
in furtherance of the institution of slavery); Karen E. Bravo, Free Labor! A Labor Liberalization Solution to Modern Trafficking in Humans, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
545, 547 (2009) [hereinafter Bravo, Free Labor!] (explaining that people are “more
vulnerable to the predations of exploitative middlemen such as traffickers in human
beings” because “borders are now more heavily policed and enforced”); James C. Hathaway, The Human Rights Quagmire of “Human Trafficking,” 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2008)
(“Indeed, the criminalization of smuggling may actaully increase the risk of human
trafficking by driving up the cost of facilitated transboarder movement and leaving the
poor with no choice but to mortgage their futures in order to pay for safe passage.”);
Anne T. Gallagher, Human Rights and Human Trafficking: Quagmire or Firm Ground? A
Response to James Hathaway, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 789, 833-34 (2009) (observing that migration regimes reinforce discrimination and inequality and positing that truly open borders could alleviate these problems).
2
Cf. Gallagher, supra note 1, at 833-34 (arguing that trafficking will decrease if the
international labor-market mobility mirrors that of goods and services).
3
See, e.g., BRIDGET ANDERSON, DOING THE DIRTY WORK? THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF
DOMESTIC LABOUR 138 (2000) (cataloging the power structure under which migrant
domestic workers operate); Itty Abraham & Willem van Schendel, Introduction: The
Making of Illicitness (describing how these barriers reflect intrastate contradictions
about what is illicit), in ILLICIT FLOWS AND CRIMINAL THINGS: STATES, BORDERS, AND
THE OTHER SIDE OF GLOBALIZATION 1, 23-24 (Willem van Schendel & Itty Abraham
eds., 2005); Bravo, Free Labor!, supra note 1, at 569-71 (discussing the “historical anomaly”
of these increased border restrictions); Hathaway, supra note 1, at 26-27 (discussing the
use of the Smuggling Protocol, an international treaty, to reinforce domestic migration
controls); Aiko Joshi, The Face of Human Trafficking, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 31, 36-38
(2002) (tracing the trafficking of dislocated workers to the forces of economic globalization); Wide Angle: Dying to Leave (PBS television broadcast Sept. 25, 2003), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/dying-to-leave/video-full-episode/1126
(discussing rising barriers to migration in developed nations).

2010]

Tensions and Trade-offs

1611

ment began in earnest in the mid-1990s and has continued to the
4
present day. And in just a few short years, the federal criminal justice
system has been converted into an important legal adjunct to the
5
growing human and technological barriers along the border. Beginning several years ago, the prosecutorial arm of the Department of
Justice turned to the systematic prosecution of thousands of misdemeanor illegal entry and felony reentry cases along the southern bor6
der. These prosecutions, which are conducted in a mere handful of
federal districts, have had a huge impact on the shape of U.S. criminal
justice. Immigration prosecutions make up over fifty percent of all
federal criminal prosecutions, handily outstripping prosecutions for
7
drug crimes, weapons possession, and white collar crime.
As immigration restrictions and border enforcement have increased, the sophistication and violence of the organizations that
promote the illicit movement of people across borders—whether in
8
the form of smuggling or trafficking—have also grown. In the U.S.
4

See, e.g., Peter Andreas, The Transformation of Migrant Smuggling Across the U.S.Mexican Border (outlining the impact of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 and subsequent acts), in GLOBAL HUMAN SMUGGLING: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 107, 112-16 (David Kyle & Rey Koslowsky eds., 2001); Wayne A. Cornelius, Controlling ‘Unwanted’ Immigration: Lessons From the United States, 1993–2004, 31 J. ETHNIC &
MIGRATION STUD. 775, 776 (2005) (describing the U.S. immigration-control strategy as
launched by President Clinton and continued through the presidency of George W.
Bush); Bill Ong Hing, The Dark Side of Operation Gatekeeper, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 121, 127-28 (2001) (outlining Operation Gatekeeper’s emphasis on deterrence).
In debates over immigration reform, the only changes that Congress has been able to
agree upon and enact have been measures increasing physical border-defense mechanisms. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control
and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1829-30 (2007) (discussing failed immigration reform bills and the passage of a law strengthening the border fence).
5
See Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 135, 135-36 (2009), http://www.columbialawreview.org/articles/managingmigration-through-crime (discussing the increasing use of criminal prosecutions as a
tool for managing migration).
6
Id. at 139-40.
7
John Schwartz, Immigration Enforcement Fuels Spike in U.S. Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
22, 2009, at A16. Since 2004, immigration prosecutions have topped the list of federal
criminal prosecutions, outstripping federal drug and weapons prosecutions, and dwarfing many other forms of federal criminal prosecutions. See TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: NEW FINDINGS (2005), http://
trac.syr.edu/tracins/latest/131 (“[I]mmigration matters now represent the single largest group of all federal prosecutions, about one third (32%) of the total. By comparison, narcotics and drugs, for many years the government’s dominant enforcement interest, dropped to about a quarter of the total (27%) and weapons matters to slightly
less than one out of ten (9%).”).
8
See GLOBAL COMM’N ON INT’L MIGRATION, MIGRATION IN AN INTERCONNECTED
WORLD: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR ACTION 33 (2005), available at http://www.gcim.org/
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context, the recent rise in border enforcement has not only fueled violence along the southern border but also has made the northward
9
journey much more difficult and expensive. As criminal networks replace mom-and-pop smuggling operations, migrants who rely on the
services of these networks are vulnerable to debt bondage, kidnapping, and exploitation. In other words, the humans that comprise the
cargo transported by professionalized networks of smugglers are in10
creasingly vulnerable to exploitation. For some migrants, what may
begin as a contractual agreement to be smuggled converts into a trafficking arrangement characterized by coercion during the course of
11
the journey.
Moreover, U.S. immigration law and policy unintentionally helps
traffickers assert control over victims once those victims are in the
United States. Unauthorized peoples are more vulnerable to threats
because they know that efforts to seek legal recourse can result in protracted immigration detention, criminal prosecution, and, of course,
removal. The legal limbo of unauthorized migrants has left many mi12
13
grant laborers reluctant to report crimes and labor violations.
attachements/gcim-complete-report-2005.pdf (cautioning about these potentially detrimental effect of efforts to prevent irregular migration on the welfare of migrants);
Andreas, supra note 4, at 112-16 (linking the boom in human-smuggling services to
tighter border policing); Maggy Lee, Human Trade and the Criminalization of Irregular
Migration, 33 INT’L J. SOC. L. 1, 1 (2005) (describing the range of criminal groups involved in trafficking); cf. Gallagher, supra note 1, at 833-34 (“If international labor migration were as free as the trade in goods and services, then there would be no need to
develop legal regimes to combat smuggling . . . . Unless and until a radical shift occurs
in the structure and orientation of current migration regimes, there will be a market
distortion; more people prepared (or forced) to move than safe and legal opportunities are available. Traffickers and smugglers are a result of this anomaly. Their existence and their future are tied up with its continuity.”).
9
See, e.g., Andreas, supra note 4, at 112-16 (detailing the effects of the expansion of
border controls along the southern U.S. border); Hing, supra note 4, at 135 (arguing that
border controls redirect the flow of illegal immigration and extract a higher human toll).
10
See Andreas, supra note 4, at 116-20 (arguing that smugglers now apply more
dangerous tactics to avoid increased penalties); Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and Myopia:
Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
2977, 3009-10 (2006) (describing how border militarization drove illegal immigrants
to high-priced smugglers); Cornelius, supra note 4, at 779 (positing that border controls force migrants to use paths that have more dangerous natural hazards); Lee, supra note 8, at 1 (describing the risks inherent in trading people as “commodities”).
11
See Dina Francesca Haynes, Exploitation Nation: The Thin and Grey Legal Lines Between Trafficked Persons and Abused Migrant Laborers, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 48-50 (2009) (providing examples of “hypothetical migrants” to illustrate the
sometimes fine line between trafficking and contractual agreements).
12
See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 4, at 1886 (“[M]any non-citizens are reluctant to
report crime because of their own fear of removal.”); Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Depor-
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The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) and its
successive reauthorizations, including the Trafficking Victims Protec15
tion Reauthorization Act of 2003 (TVPRA 2003), the Trafficking Vic16
tims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005 (TVPRA 2005), and the
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
17
Act of 2008 (TVPRA 2008), were designed to remedy some of the
forces generated by U.S. immigration policy that have the effect of
promoting trafficking in persons. In particular, these laws not only
targeted traffickers for unique punishment (over and above that
which would apply to smugglers) but also created a legal space for unauthorized migrant victims to come forward to report and seek pro18
tection from trafficking. Some of the relevant legal mechanisms included the T visas that allow victims of trafficking to normalize their

tation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1455-56 (2006)
(discussing sanctuary policies as a means of encouraging unauthorized migrants to report crime); Leslye E. Orloff et al., Battered Immigrant Women’s Willingness to Call for Help
and Police Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 43, 67-68 (2003) (finding extremely low reporting rates for rape victims without lawful immigration status); Robert C. Davis & Edna
Erez, Immigrant Populations as Victims: Toward a Multicultural Criminal Justice System, NAT’L
INST. JUST.: RES. IN BRIEF, May 1998, at 1, 4-5, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/
167571.pdf (discussing the unique hardships that discourage immigrants from reporting crimes and analyzing data related to who does and who does not report crimes).
13
See Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for
Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179, 2183 (1994) (explaining
how the risk of deportation deters immigrants from reporting labor and employment
violations); Dina Francesca Haynes, Used, Abused, Arrested and Deported: Extending Immigration Benefits to Protect the Victims of Trafficking and to Secure the Prosecution of Traffickers, 26
HUM. RTS. Q. 221, 257 (2004) (“A lack of viable and legal migration options leads people
into trafficking; fear of deportation keeps them there.”); Leticia M. Saucedo, A New “U”:
Organizing Victims and Protecting Immigrant Workers, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 891, 914-35 (2008)
(discussing the effect of the U visa on reporting of labor and employment violations);
Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 669 (2003)
(noting that many undocumented workers are reluctant “to report their harsh working
conditions for fear they will attract the attention of immigration authorities”).
14
Pub. L. No. 106-386, §§ 101–113, 114 Stat. 1466, 1466-91 (codified as amended
at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7110 (2006)).
15
Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8, 18 & 22 U.S.C.).
16
Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18, 22 & 42 U.S.C.).
17
Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8, 18, 22 & 42 U.S.C.).
18
See, e.g., Kelly E. Hyland, Protecting Human Victims of Trafficking: An American
Framework, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 29, 62 (2001) (describing the Act’s three-tier approach targeting prevention, protection, and prosecution); Susan Tiefenbrun, The Cultural, Political, and Legal Climate Behind the Fight to Stop Trafficking in Women: William J. Clinton’s Legacy to Women’s Rights, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 855, 876-77 (2006) (same).

1614

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 158: 1609

immigration status, at least temporarily; resources from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that provide trafficking
victims with a means of support and access to necessary services; and a
clearly communicated policy of nonprosecution for trafficking vic19
tims. The reauthorizations of the TVPA also have added a private
right of action for trafficking victims against their traffickers and add20
ed special protections for child victims.
The TVPA has made progress in ensuring the protection of trafficking victims and the prosecution of traffickers in the United
21
States. Since the original TVPA was enacted in 2000, over two thousand individuals—both victims of trafficking and qualifying family
22
members—have gained access to T visas. This not only allows them
to normalize their legal status in the United States but also provides
them with a range of services from HHS that are designed to provide
them with a financial safety net and a source of treatment for the
physical and psychological injuries that they have suffered as a result
23
of their trafficking. Moreover, the U.S. government has successfully
prosecuted over three hundred individuals for their participation in
24
various trafficking schemes.
Unfortunately, the humanitarian aims of the TVPA are often hindered because the goal of protecting exploited migrants frequently
25
runs squarely into the competing goal of enforcing immigration laws.

19

For a discussion of these features of the TVPA, and critiques thereof, see, for example, Dina Francesca Haynes, (Not) Found Chained to a Bed in a Brothel: Conceptual, Legal,
and Procedural Failures to Fulfill the Promise of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 21 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 337, 365-73 (2007), and Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect Victims and Real Survivors:
The Iconic Victim in Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L. REV. 157, 179-84 (2007).
20
The private right of action was added in the 2003 TVPRA. For additional discussion of the private right of action, see note 58 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the additional protections for migrant children, see note 68 and accompanying text.
21
For a relatively optimistic assessment of its effects, see, for example, Susan W.
Tiefenbrun, Updating the Domestic and International Impact of the U.S. Victims of Trafficking
Protection Act of 2000: Does Law Deter Crime?, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 249, 278-79
(2006–2007).
22
2009 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS & ASSESSMENT OF U.S. GOV’T ACTIVITIES
TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 35, available at http://
www.justice.gov/ag/annualreports/tr2008/agreporthumantrafficing2008.pdf [hereinafter ATT’Y GEN. 2008 TRAFFICKING REPORT].
23
For a discussion of benefits provided by HHS to trafficking victims, see id. at 9-23.
24
See id. at 36 (providing data regarding the number of investigations undertaken
by the FBI’s Civil Rights Unit pertaining to human trafficking).
25
See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 10, at 3022-23 (arguing that the TVPA’s “unwillingness to extend protections to ‘illegal workers’ absent a showing of their ‘innocence’
embeds into the TVPA the same immigration and labor law policies that have created a
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The line between voluntary migrants who participate in smuggling
schemes and unwilling trafficking victims—a line that is often murky at
26
27
best —has been vigilantly policed. The ability of public officials to use
the tools of the TVPA to assist trafficking victims is thereby limited by
28
the more powerful prerogatives of immigration enforcement.
This is not to suggest that the TVPA has failed. U.S. antitrafficking
efforts, like the international efforts to protect trafficking victims, have
been important in protecting a small number of victims, punishing a
small number of traffickers, and, perhaps most importantly, raising
awareness about the nature and scope of the international trafficking
problem. These advances are worthy of recognition. Nevertheless, it is
equally important to acknowledge that antitrafficking efforts in the
United States and elsewhere have been heavily constrained by the politics and policies of rigid immigration enforcement. In the end, there
is no way to eliminate the scourge of trafficking on the international
level as long as cross-border movement is subject to the high degree of
regulation and criminalization that characterizes the contemporary
global order.
More troublingly, some efforts to address the problem of trafficking within the framework of heightened border restrictions have the
perhaps unintended effect of reinforcing migrants’ vulnerability to
exploitation. This Article seeks to expose some of the tensions and
trade-offs between immigration policy choices and antitrafficking efforts. Part I of this Article focuses on the ways in which antitrafficking
advocacy and policies can actually fuel the discourse that drives restrictionist immigration policies. Discussions regarding trafficking—
including media coverage of trafficking, law enforcement antitrafficking-training efforts, and official statements on trafficking—have
haven for trafficking and migrant exploitation”). See generally Haynes, supra note 19;
Srikantiah, supra note 19.
26
See, e.g., BRIDGET ANDERSON & JULIA O’CONNELL DAVIDSON, TRAFFICKING—A DEMAND LED PROBLEM?: A MULTI-COUNTRY PILOT STUDY 18 (2002), available at http://
www.unodc.org/pdf/brazil/trafficking-a%20demand%20led%20problem.pdf (discussing how the lack of distinction leads to research challenges); Bravo, Free Labor!, supra
note 1, at 554-55 (describing a “flawed” distinction between trafficking and smuggling); Srikantiah, supra note 19, at 191-95 (“[S]muggling and trafficking are hard to
distinguish from one another.”).
27
See CATHERINE DAUVERGNE, MAKING PEOPLE ILLEGAL: WHAT GLOBALIZATION
MEANS FOR MIGRATION AND LAW 89-91 (2008) (discussing efforts to develop a bright-line
distinction between smuggling and trafficking); Chacón, supra note 10, at 3027 (noting
that smuggled individuals “are unlikely to receive the protections of the TVPA”).
28
See Chacón, supra note 10, at 3027 (discussing how immigration enforcement and
strict law enforcement standards are prioritized to the detriment of trafficking victims).
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played into and compounded the myth of migrant criminality. Rather
than increasing the focus on the ways in which immigration enforcement policies can foster exploitation, discussions about trafficking have
tended to focus on particular bad actors. And the “bad actors” that are
scrutinized are neither the middle-class beneficiaries of labor exploitation nor the customers who purchase services in the sex trade but the
migrants who service the markets that these other actors create.
While it is certainly desirable to punish traffickers, ignoring the
complicity of the vast array of people who generate the markets that
traffickers service results in a misleading view of the trafficking problem. In popular discourse concerning the trafficking of migrants, the
traffickers—almost always identified as noncitizen men or men of color, but occasionally including noncitizen women—bear sole responsibility for the human misery of trafficking. Framing the trafficking
problem in this way fits comfortably within the larger narrative that
has been constructed around unauthorized migration—a narrative in
which migrant laborers are presented as criminal interlopers, but
their criminality is entirely detached from the conduct of the consumers of their labor.
Part II of this Article explores how growing attention to the trafficking issue (in the United States and internationally) has occurred
alongside, and has served as an additional justification for, the increasing reliance on the criminal justice system to manage migration. Section II.A explores the extent to which references to trafficking have
been used to justify, among other things, greater law enforcement
presence along the U.S.-Mexico border, greater numbers of prosecutors in border districts, and the rapid acceleration of immigrationrelated prosecutions. This has been the case even though very few of
the resulting interdictions and prosecutions ultimately result directly
in the protection of trafficking victims and even though the increased
policing of the border and criminalization of migration can strengthen the hand of traffickers. Section II.B of this Article explores the
development of state antitrafficking statutes and analyzes the extent to
which these efforts can be understood as part of the larger trend of
states and localities attempting to assert greater legal authority to participate in immigration enforcement.
By situating the issue of U.S. antitrafficking policies within the
broader framework of U.S. immigration enforcement policies, this Article seeks to highlight some of the inherent tensions that emerge
when nations embrace the goal of protecting trafficking victims while
enforcing a highly restrictive immigration policy. This is not to suggest
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that antitrafficking efforts are hopeless or undesirable in the present
world order. To the contrary, it is clearly a positive development that
certain victims are obtaining assistance and redress and that certain
perpetrators are being fittingly punished. However, by highlighting
the tension between current restrictionist approaches to immigration
and antitrafficking efforts, this Article serves to caution those who
support more aggressive antitrafficking efforts to be sensitive to the
ways in which such efforts can be (and have been) used to bolster
immigration enforcement policies that can ultimately fuel the exploitation lying at the heart of the global trafficking phenomenon.
I. FRAMING ANTITRAFFICKING POLICY WITHIN THE
DISCOURSE OF MIGRANT CRIMINALITY
International human trafficking is certainly not a new problem.
This phenomenon has existed throughout history, and over the past
century, the international community has addressed various aspects of
29
the trafficking problem. There is no doubt that it took the Protocol
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
30
Women and Children (the “Trafficking Protocol” or “Protocol”),
however, to push the issue of international trafficking to the forefront
of international legal concerns. It was only after the enactment of the
Trafficking Protocol that powerful nations, including the United
States, began to address the problem of international trafficking in
31
their own legislation and international foreign policy. The Protocol,
and the domestic legislation it has engendered, have moved the
antitrafficking agenda firmly into the sphere of criminal law enforcement. Section I.A discusses the positive and negative practical effects
of framing the antitrafficking agenda in terms of the criminal law.
Section I.B explores the extent to which this new framing has fueled a

29

See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child arts. 32-36, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 (prohibiting trafficking of children, exploitation of children, and forced or
exploitative labor); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women art. 6, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (prohibiting exploitation of the
prostitution of women); International Agreement for the Suppression of the “White
Slave Traffic,” May 18, 1904, 35 Stat. 1979, 1 L.N.T.S. 83 (providing protections for
trafficked women).
30
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, Nov. 15, 2000, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-16 (2004), 2237
U.N.T.S. 319 [hereinafter Trafficking Protocol].
31
See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing requirements of the
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the resulting Trafficking Victims Protection Act in the United States).
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discourse of migrant criminality that ironically increases the vulnerability of migrants to exploitation.
A. Trafficking as an Immigration Crime
The Trafficking Protocol was part of a broader effort by states to
carve out an international cooperative agreement on transnational
32
crime. This effort included not only a transnational crime conven33
tion and supplementary treaties on trafficking and migrant smug34
gling but also side agreements on illicit small-arms manufacture and
35
trade. As such, treaty negotiators quite correctly and understandably
36
treated international trafficking as a subset of international crime.
Trafficking is a crime. Therefore, it is neither surprising nor problematic to treat trafficking as a worthy subject of international criminal
law and to use criminal law as a tool for deterring and punishing traf37
ficking offenses. Indeed, failure to prioritize trafficking crimes was
akin to other international legal failures to address concerns emerging within the spheres of work and home—areas that were construed
as “private” and where, not coincidentally, great harms were visited
against socially marginalized groups, particularly women and children.
Nevertheless, in placing the trafficking issue within the framework
of an international criminal convention, the Trafficking Protocol
32

See Gallagher, supra note 1, at 789-90 (recounting the initial meetings that eventually led to the Trafficking Protocol).
33
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15,
2000, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-16 (2004), 2225 U.N.T.S. 209.
34
Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Nov. 15,
2000, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-16 (2004), 2241 U.N.T.S. 480. Smuggling is defined as
“the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is
not a national or a permanent resident.” Id. art. III, ¶ a.
35
Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their
Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/255, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/55/255 ( June 8, 2001).
36
See Trafficking Protocol, supra note 30, pmbl., at 343 (“[S]upplementing the
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime with an international instrument for the prevention, suppression and punishment of trafficking in
persons, especially women and children, will be useful in preventing and combating
that crime . . . .”).
37
See, e.g., HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 56-59 (2000) (discussing and dissecting this
public/private dichotomy); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE STATE 237-40 (1989) (locating much of the discrimination faced by women
outside the sphere of public recognition and protection).
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shifted antitrafficking priorities from the protection of human rights
38
to the prosecution of international criminals. Critics assert that, in
so doing, the Trafficking Protocol took an approach to antitrafficking
that bolstered international prosecutorial efforts at the expense of international efforts—and agencies—dedicated to enhancing interna39
tional human rights. Moreover, this approach allowed governments
to implement harsh border-control measures under the guise of insti40
tuting antitrafficking legislation.
In response to this criticism, defenders of the Trafficking Protocol
approach have noted that, prior to the treaties negotiated at Palermo,
the international community was not taking any truly effective meas41
ures to combat the international trafficking problem. While a prosecution-centered approach has drawbacks, it has the virtue of attracting
international attention to the issue of trafficking and motivating powerful state actors to consider the trafficking problem worthy of both
international and domestic attention. Prior to the negotiation of the
38

See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Bruch, Models Wanted: The Search for an Effective Response to
Human Trafficking, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2004) (noting that, with regard to trafficking, “the predominant approach has come from a law enforcement perspective”); Janie Chuang, The United States As Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437, 448 (2006) (noting the nonobligatory nature
of the victim-protection provisions); Anne Gallagher, Human Rights and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: A Preliminary Analysis, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 975,
976, 989 (2001) (noting that the law enforcement concerns dominated negotiations and
that victim-protection provisions of the Protocol are not obligatory); see also Gallagher,
supra note 1, at 790-91 (noting that the Protocol did a better job with regard to establishing a structure for punishing traffickers than for protecting the rights of victims, but observing that sufficient (particularly regional) mechanisms exist to fill that gap).
39
See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 1, at 4-6 (“[T]he fight against human trafficking is
more fundamentally in tension with core human rights goals than has generally been
recognized.”). But cf. Gallagher, supra note 1, at 792-93 (noting several advantages to
the international human rights approach vis-à-vis the criminal approach, but ultimately
concluding that the latter approach has had greater practical effect).
40
See Hathaway, supra note 1, at 6 (“[T]he border control emphasis inherent in
the Trafficking Protocol and its companion Smuggling Protocol has provided states
with a reason—or at least a rationalization—for the intensification of broadly based
efforts to prevent the arrival or entry of unauthorized noncitizens.”).
41
Anne Gallagher noted this point in her response to James Hathaway:
Despite an impressive array of international legal protections, it was clear to
our organizations that forced labor, child labor, debt bondage, forced marriage, and commercial sexual exploitation of children and adults were flourishing, unchecked in many parts of the world. . . . We all believed that trafficking was indeed an appropriate focus for international law. We also agreed
that the existing international legal framework was woefully inadequate, and
the chances of the human rights system coming to the rescue were slim.
Gallagher, supra note 1, at 790.
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Trafficking Protocol, antitrafficking efforts were quite marginalized.
In contrast, since the passage of the Trafficking Protocol, international human rights organizations have been guided by the coherent definitions supplied by the criminal convention in devising and supervising responses to trafficking. In so doing, they have raised the profile
43
of the fight against exploitation. For defenders of the Trafficking
Protocol, the gains made in the fight against international trafficking
since 1999 far outweigh the costs of shifting the antitrafficking paradigm from a predominantly human rights–based to a predominantly
44
criminal law–based approach.
U.S. antitrafficking efforts have prompted a similar split of opinion. Comprehensive U.S. antitrafficking legislation never achieved
momentum until after the completion of the Trafficking Protocol.
However, the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,
which was the parent instrument of the Trafficking Protocol, required
45
state parties to incorporate a trafficking offense into domestic law.
46
In response, the United States enacted the TVPA. With some nar42

See id. at 792 (“When trafficking belonged exclusively to human rights, there was
one long ago treaty that nobody but the fringe dwellers intent on abolishing prostitution cared about, occasional, confused reports emanating from a marginal and marginalized body (the UN Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery), and very
little else. . . . [N]ot even the treaty bodies were much help.” (footnote omitted)). For
a more detailed critique of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery,
see, for example, Hathaway, supra note 1, at 20-24.
43
See Gallagher, supra note 1, at 824-25 (discussing the development of international institutions and norms that have flowed from the Trafficking Protocol).
44
See id. at 824 (arguing that the increased attention to both private and governmental obligations to prevent exploitation “lays to rest any concerns that the global
campaign against trafficking has wasted effort and resources”).
45
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note
33, art. 34, ¶ 2. By 2008, 98 of the world’s 155 countries had “adopted a specific offence
criminalizing trafficking in persons.” U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL REPORT
ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 22 (2009), available at http://www.unodc.org/
documents/Global_Report_on_TIP.pdf.
46
Pub. L. No. 106-386, §§ 101–113, 114 Stat. 1466, 1466-91 (codified as amended at
22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7110 (2006)). The Council of Europe’s Convention on Action Against
Trafficking in Humans entered into force on February 1, 2008; as of March 9, 2010,
twenty-six countries have ratified it. See ROSARIO PARDO, COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS: HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS app. II (2009), available at http://assembly.coe.int/committeedocs/2007/
Trafficking-human-beings_E.pdf. The convention purports to address the trafficking
problem “with a view to victim protection measures and international cooperation.”
Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings and Its Explanatory Report, ¶ 37, at 32, C.E.T.S. No. 197 (May 16, 2005), available at
http://www.coe.int/T/E/human_rights/trafficking/PDF_conv_197_trafficking_e.pdf. It
is interesting that the European Convention highlights protection, whereas the U.S.
model implicitly elevates prosecution as the most important antitrafficking goal.
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rowing, it borrowed the international definition of trafficking and
also engaged in an approach focused on prosecution of traffickers,
48
prevention of trafficking, and protection of victims. One of the most
frequent criticisms of the U.S. antitrafficking legislation is that it overemphasizes prosecution, and that it often does so at the expense of
49
victim protection.
As in the context of the International Protocol, it is important not
to overstate this argument. First of all, it is not clear that antitrafficking legislation aimed primarily at victim protection would have garnered congressional support. To the extent that positive steps have
been taken toward curbing international trafficking, it is only because
advocates recognized the strong support that could be brought to bear
50
for a prosecution-centered bill. Second, the TVPA created the legisla47

See Chacón, supra note 10, at 2984-85 (noting that the TVPA provides protections
and benefits only for victims of “severe forms of trafficking in persons”—a category that
is slightly narrower than that covered by the Protocol’s definition of trafficking).
48
See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (laying out the threefold purposes of the Act).
49
See, e.g., Claire Bishop, The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000: Three Years
Later, 41 INT’L MIGRATION 219, 227 (2003) (advocating for a two-step immigration
process in order to fulfill the law enforcement and victim-protection goals); Bravo, Exploring, supra note 1, at 240-43 (questioning whether trafficking can be solved without
greater attention to root causes); Joan Fitzpatrick, Trafficking as a Human Rights Violation: The Complex Intersection of Legal Frameworks for Conceptualizing and Combating Trafficking, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1143, 1166-67 (2003) (arguing that more than simple law
enforcement is needed to combat trafficking); Haynes, supra note 19, at 345-46 (asserting that victim protection is often conditioned on the willingness of victims to cooperate with law enforcement); Hussein Sadruddin et al., Human Trafficking in the United
States: Expanding the Victim Protection Act Beyond Prosecution Witnesses, 16 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 379, 381 (2005) (arguing that the Act is more concerned with prosecution
than victim protection); Srikantiah, supra note 19, at 159-60 (arguing that allocating
the responsibility for identifying trafficking victims to law enforcement investigators
and prosecutors leads to “a failure to identify . . . those who do not present themselves
as good prosecution witnesses” and yields “non-uniform results”); Joyce Koo Dalrymple, Book Note, Human Trafficking: Protecting Human Rights in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 451, 454-56 (2005) (reviewing CRAIG MCGILL,
HUMAN TRAFFIC: SEX, SLAVES & IMMIGRATION (2003)) (maintaining that the requirements trafficking victims must meet to qualify for protection are overly stringent); Developments in the Law: Jobs and Borders, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2171, 2193-2202 (2005) (positing that the overemphasis of prosecution-oriented components of the TVPA, relative
to components of the Act dedicated to victim protection and global prevention, accounts for the Act’s shortcomings).
50
The TVPA and the accompanying immigration-related provisions of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) are among the very few recent pieces of legislation that liberalize immigration in any way. Almost all immigration-related legislation,
and certainly all major immigration bills passed since 1990, have increased restrictions
on migration and eased barriers to removal. See, e.g., Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1103, 1701
(2006)); REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (codified as amended
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tive impetus behind the State Department’s annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report, which has come to function as an influential moni51
toring and unilateral compliance regime for international trafficking.
Finally, sustained criticism of the original TVPA as insufficiently attentive to humanitarian and human rights concerns has yielded a number of ameliorative developments in the passage of reauthorizing legislation in 2003, 2005, and 2008, as well as in the implementation of
regulations. Collectively, these changes have helped to address some
of the flaws in the initial legislation that tilted it too heavily toward the
needs of prosecutors at the expense of victims.
One example of an ameliorative development in reauthorizing
legislation is the change that Congress made to the requirements for
52
the T visa. A T visa is the means by which a noncitizen victim of trafficking can obtain temporary lawful status, which can be converted in53
to lawful permanent residency in some cases. In order to receive a T
visa, the noncitizen must be “a victim of a severe form of trafficking in
persons,” must be present in the United States, and, perhaps most
controversially, must assist law enforcement by cooperating with “any
reasonable request” from a law enforcement agent concerning the in54
vestigation and prosecution of her trafficker. In the 2005 reauthoriin scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-587 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
51
See Gallagher, supra note 1, at 826-27 (exploring the function of the TIP report). There are many criticisms of the State Department’s methodology and practices
with regard to the TIP report. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HUMAN
TRAFFICKING: BETTER DATA, STRATEGY, AND REPORTING NEEDED TO ENHANCE U.S. ANTITRAFFICKING EFFORTS ABROAD 26-28 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d06825.pdf (listing credibility problems with the TIP reports). Moreover,
because of the imperfect overlap between U.S. antitrafficking goals and international
trafficking policy, it is not clear that State Department monitoring and threats of sanctions effectively advance the specific goals of the international antitrafficking regime.
See, e.g., Chuang, supra note 38, at 466-73 (comparing U.S. and international antitrafficking goals). But the reports have highlighted and encouraged action on a number
of international trafficking issues that had previously received insufficient attention.
52
The T visa was created by section 107(e) of the TVPA. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 107(e), 114 Stat. 1466, 1477-79 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(15)).
53
After three years in “T status,” T visa recipients may apply for permanent residency pursuant to immigration regulations governing status adjustments. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255(l).
54
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(I). A T visa requires a determination by the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security that the noncitizen (1) is a victim of
a “severe form of trafficking,” as defined in 22 U.S.C. § 7102 (2006); (2) “is physically
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zation of the TVPA, Congress relaxed the law enforcement cooperation requirement by allowing the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Attorney General, to find a request from law enforcement officials “unreasonable” if “a trafficking victim, due to psychological or physical trauma, is unable to cooperate with a request for
55
assistance.” Although further liberalizing adjustments are certainly in
56
57
order, these changes suggest that pressure by critics to better align
the balance between prosecution and protection is having an effect.
A second example of an improvement in antitrafficking legislation
in the years since the 2000 enactment of the TVPA is the addition of a
private right of action for trafficking victims who wish to bring civil ac58
tions against their traffickers. Individuals who have suffered severe
forms of exploitation can now bring lawsuits in cases in which the
government did not choose to proceed with criminal trials. One of
the areas in which this is having effect is cases involving labor exploitation. Throughout the TVPA’s existence, the government has prose59
cuted fewer cases of labor trafficking than sex trafficking. Moreover,
present in the United States” or its territories or possessions, or a port of entry thereto;
(3) “has complied with any reasonable request for assistance” in the investigation or
prosecution of acts of trafficking; and (4) would suffer “extreme hardship involving unusual and severe harm upon removal.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i).
55
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(iii).
56
See Srikantiah, supra note 19, at 181 n.141 (noting that law enforcement agents
are likely to implement this statutory provision in the same manner as the certification
required under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i) and therefore that “prosecutors and investigators will continue to serve in a gate-keeping function as to identification of trafficking victims”).
57
For an earlier criticism of the law enforcement certification requirement, see
Sadruddin et al., supra note 49, at 410-13, in which the authors propose an exception
to certification be allowed in some cases. The T visa was based on the model used for
the S visa. Because the T visa is based on the model of prior visas designed to assist law
enforcement, it is not designed primarily to protect victims’ rights. See Chacón, supra
note 10, at 3026-27 (criticizing the reliance on the S visa model without sensitivity to
the different contexts in which the two visas are issued).
58
18 U.S.C. § 1595 (2006).
59
See ATT’Y GEN. 2008 TRAFFICKING REPORT, supra note 22, at 38 (“In FY 2008, ICE
opened 432 human trafficking investigations, which consisted of 170 investigations of
forced labor and 262 investigations of commercial sexual exploitation . . . . ICE made
189 criminal arrests for offenses related to human trafficking. Of the 189 arrests, 128
were for crimes involving sexual exploitation and 61 were for forced labor related violations.”); CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT
HUMAN TRAFFICKING: FISCAL YEARS 2001–2005, at 25-27 (2006), available at http://
www.justice.gov/crt/crim/part_5.pdf [hereinafter DOJ REPORT] (presenting statistics
on sex trafficking and labor trafficking cases filed); see also Grace Chang & Kathleen
Kim, Reconceptualizing Approaches to Human Trafficking: New Directions and Perspectives from
the Field(s), 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 317, 336 (2007) (noting that sex trafficking prosecutions are more numerous than labor trafficking prosecutions and arguing that “[t]hese
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the government’s labor trafficking prosecutions have tended to focus
60
on noncitizens, not on U.S. companies. By contrast, private actions
brought under the TVPA have targeted, among other entities, corpo61
rations that have engaged in exploitative labor practices. Of course,
it would be overstating the matter to claim that the addition of the
private right of action has had a very large impact on the trafficking
problem. Empirical study has demonstrated that only a small handful
of complainants have filed such suits since the creation of the right of
62
action in 2003. Nevertheless, the private right of action, which is
63
mirrored in several state antitrafficking provisions, provides another
example of a liberalizing measure undertaken in response to outside
64
critiques of the TVPA.
A third improvement to the TVPA is that with each reauthorization, the TVPA has expanded the scope of legal protections available
to migrants who are minors. This is true even for children who are
not victims of trafficking. The 2008 reauthorization provides for volun65
66
tary departure for minors at no expense to the child and also re-

numbers are disproportionate to estimates from non-governmental organizations and
academic researchers asserting that approximately one-half to two-thirds of all trafficking in the U.S. occurs in non-sex related industries”).
60
See, e.g., ATT’Y GEN. 2008 TRAFFICKING REPORT, supra note 22, app. B at 83-86
(listing “examples of cases,” none of which involve corporate defendants).
61
See, e.g., David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, No. 08-1220, 2009 WL 5215326, at *2 (E.D.
La. Dec. 28, 2009) (explaining that plaintiffs alleged “horrible” conditions); Complaint, Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, No. 08-05626, 2008 WL 3978577 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
27, 2008) (alleging human trafficking by a corporation). Indeed, one empirical study
conducted in 2007 found no civil claims of sex trafficking but identified thirty-four labor trafficking allegations across eighteen separate complaints. See Jennifer S. Nam,
Note, The Case of the Missing Case: Examining the Civil Right of Action for Human Trafficking Victims, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1671 (2007) (examining U.S. District Court
complaints alleging claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1595).
62
See Nam, supra note 61, at 1671 (arguing that the number of cases filed “pales in
comparison” to the estimated number of trafficking incidents).
63
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.5 (West 2007) (allowing civil suits for trafficking
violations); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571i (Supp. 2009) (authorizing civil actions for trafficking victims); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 772.104 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009) (allowing civil
suits); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-3.5-3 (West Supp. 2008) (allowing civil trafficking suits).
64
See Kathleen Kim & Kusia Hreschynshyn, Human Trafficking Private Right of Action: Civil Rights for Trafficked Persons in the United States, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1
(2004) (exploring the benefits of the private right of action); Kathleen Kim, The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney General: A Model for Enforcing the Civil Rights of Undocumented Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 247 (same).
65
“Voluntary departure” is a legal term of art defined as per the parameters established by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2006).
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quires that, “to the greatest extent practicable,” the Secretary of Health
and Human Services provide unaccompanied minors with access to
67
These and other
counsel, including free access where necessary.
68
changes to the legal status of noncitizen minors provide direct and indirect means of identifying and protecting child trafficking victims.
On the regulatory side, guidelines for the U visa, which was
created in the 2000 TVPA, were finally promulgated in September
69
2007. The U visa provides a mechanism for normalizing the status of
noncitizens who may not be eligible for T visas because they do not
70
qualify as victims of “severe form[s] of trafficking in persons.” The U
visa provides an alternative remedy for these individuals and also
opens up a possible means of protecting a range of individuals who,
although not “trafficking victims,” have been subjected to various
71
forms of exploitation and abuse, including labor exploitation.
These, and other, changes that Congress—and, in the case of the
U visa regulations, the executive branch—have made to the TVPA
over the past decade illustrate the positive effect of sustained criticism
regarding the TVPA’s initial overemphasis on criminal enforcement at
the expense of victim protection. These changes do not, however, alter the fundamental balance of the law, which still prioritizes prosecution over victim protection. That implementation of antitrafficking
efforts by the Department of Homeland Security has been situated in
the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) branch of the Department, rather than U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

66

See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235(a)(5)(D)(ii), 122 Stat. 5044, 5077 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(5)(D)(ii)).
67
Id. § 235(c)(5) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(5)).
68
For a complete discussion of the legal relief provided for minors under the 2008
reauthorization, see generally Deborah Lee et al., Update on Legal Relief Options for Unaccompanied Alien Children Following the Enactment of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, AILA InfoNet Doc. No. 09021830 (Feb. 19, 2009).
69
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), issued the U visa regulation on September
17, 2007, which became effective thirty days after its approval. New Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity; Eligibility for “U” Nonimmigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,014
(Sept. 17, 2007) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 214, 248, 274a & 299 (2009)).
70
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(I); see also supra note 54 (discussing T visa requirements).
71
New Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity; Eligibility for “U” Nonimmigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. at 53,036. For a complete discussion of how the U visa could
be used as a tool to enhance workplace protection, see Saucedo, supra note 13.
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72

(USCIS), demonstrates that the capture and prosecution of traffickers is the mechanism by which DHS hopes to address the trafficking
problem. Victim assistance is subjugated to the first-order priority of
immigration enforcement.
As in the context of domestic violence, one could justify a law enforcement–centered approach by arguing that the government’s willingness to use the criminal law as a tool to combat trafficking demon73
strates its serious commitment to dealing with this issue.
When
antitrafficking policy is limited to humanitarian responses to victims,
this can send a signal to perpetrators that their actions are not serious
enough to warrant criminal punishment. Obviously, this is not the
message that the government ought to send to traffickers.
On the other hand, one can accept the need to treat trafficking as a
serious crime and still design a system that strikes a different balance
74
between prosecution and victim protection. For example, a victimcentered approach to antitrafficking policy would not contain a default
requirement that victims of trafficking undergo the difficulties of partic-

72

See Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Gives Voice to
Victims of Human Trafficking in the United States (Nov. 2, 2009) [hereinafter ICE Press
Release], available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/0911/091102washingtondc.htm (“As a
primary mission area, ICE has the overall goal of preventing human trafficking in the
United States by prosecuting the traffickers, and rescuing and protecting the victims.”).
During the Symposium at which this Article was presented, J.J. Rosenbaum discussed the
difficulties that arise from the fact that ICE does the initial law enforcement screening to
determine whether an individual qualifies as a trafficking victim. J.J. Rosenbaum, Remarks at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review Symposium: Trafficking in Sex and
Labor: Domestic and International Responses (Nov. 13, 2009).
73
For a discussion and critique of the ways in which sexual and domestic violence
long have been considered part of the “private” sphere and not subject to public legal
constraints, see, for example, ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 87-97 (2000) and Sally Goldfarb, Public Rights for “Private” Wrongs: Sexual Harassment and the Violence Against Women Act, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 516 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004).
74
See, e.g., Carole Angel, Immigration Relief for Human Trafficking Victims: Focusing
the Lens on the Human Rights of Victims, 7 MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 23,
31 (2007) (arguing for a decoupling of criminal law goals from efforts to provide aid to
victims); Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Modern-Day Slavery and Cultural Bias: Proposals for
Reforming the U.S. Visa System for Victims of International Human Trafficking, 7 NEV. L.J.
826, 831 (2007) (same); Tala Hartsough, Asylum for Trafficked Women: Escape Strategies
Beyond the T Visa, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 98 (2002) (same); Charles Song &
Suzy Lee, Between a Sharp Rock and a Very Hard Place: The Trafficking Victims Protection Act
and the Unintended Consequences of the Law Enforcement Cooperation Requirement, 1 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 133, 135 (2006) (same); Jayashri Srikantiah, Remarks at
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review Symposium: Trafficking in Sex and Labor:
Domestic and International Responses (Nov. 13, 2009) (proposing modifications of
the law enforcement certification requirements for T visas).
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75

ipating in criminal prosecution in order to receive protection. Eliminating such barriers to victim protection would be consistent with the
government’s approach in other areas of the law. A domestic violence
victim, for example, is not required to serve as a prosecution witness
against her abuser to receive a restraining order or shelter; she is simply
entitled to these legal and physical protections. The same ought to be
true of the trafficking victim. A human rights–centered approach
would link the protection of victims directly to the violation, not to the
76
needs of the government seeking to prosecute the violation.
What complicates the situation in the case of the noncitizen trafficking victim in need of a T visa is that the victim frequently is present
in the United States in violation of the nation’s immigration laws. Policymakers are clearly reluctant to develop any antitrafficking policies
77
that could potentially encourage unlawful immigration. Lawmakers
seek to maintain clear distinctions between noncitizens who have voluntarily contracted to be smuggled into the country and those who
78
are here as a direct consequence of force, fraud, or coercion.
The vigilant policing of the line between smuggling and trafficking occurs not only in the United States but in all developed countries. One writer has characterized this line as “an all-important line
in the battle for sovereignty and the nation-state as traditionally understood, and for maintaining the clear bright line between us and
75

See, e.g., Sadruddin et al., supra note 49, at 398-406, 413-16 (describing the psychological trauma associated with being trafficked and testifying as a trafficking victim
in a criminal trial).
76
See DAUVERGNE, supra note 27, at 85. The linking of legal protections to cooperation with law enforcement is increasingly common in immigration law. See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement Tools in the
“War” on Terrorism?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1073 (2002) (“[I]mmigration law . . . can also
be employed as an incentive or a reward for cooperation and information provided in
criminal investigations. This reward function has grown in importance as other immigration benefits have been restricted or eliminated, including deportation waivers.”).
77
See Chacón, supra note 10, at 3021-22 (describing congressional opposition to
providing assistance to trafficking victims who consented to their initial smuggling but
later became victims of exploitation); Srikantiah, supra note 19, at 191 n.194 (“The
House Judiciary Committee, for example, imposed an annual cap of five thousand T
visas ‘[i]n order that this bill never become a general amnesty program for smuggled
aliens.’ Representative Chris Smith, the bill’s sponsor, explained that the cap was necessary to ‘prevent this form of relief from being abused’ and ‘prevent large numbers
of aliens from falsely claiming to be trafficking victims.’” (citation omitted) (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 106-487, pt. 2, at 18 (2000); 146 CONG. REC. 18,056, 18,056-57 (2000)
(statement of Rep. Smith))).
78
See Chacón, supra note 10, at 3022-23 (explaining that under the TVPA, assistance is limited for “individuals who may have played some volitional role in their
transportation and employment, but who are now trapped in virtual slavery”).
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them that keeps the status quo for migration law in place.” This observation raises the fundamental critique to which I now turn: while
antitrafficking legislation has been revised to better assist victims, at a
broader level, antitrafficking discourse at times has drawn upon and
perpetuated a discourse that compounds myths of migrant criminality.
B. Victim Vulnerability and the Myth of Migrant Criminality
As previously noted, global social, economic, and political forces
have contributed in complex ways to the development of the interna80
tional trafficking epidemic. Yet the discourse around trafficking—
including media coverage of trafficking, law enforcement antitrafficking training efforts, and official statements on trafficking—has tended
to focus not on these complex global forces but on particularly “bad
actors.” The “bad actors” that are scrutinized tend to be other noncitizens involved in supplying certain markets with trafficked persons
rather than the population that consumes the goods and services that
these trafficking victims provide.
One can see this in the Department of Justice’s public statements
concerning antitrafficking prosecutions. For several years, the Department frequently published trafficking bulletins in which it dis81
cussed its successful trafficking prosecutions. Although that practice
has ended, the Department continues to publicize its successful traf82
ficking prosecutions and to summarize some of the most notable
83
cases in its annual report to Congress. The striking feature of the
case summaries is that they highlight cases in which virtually every de84
fendant is a noncitizen or member of a minority racial group. None
of the cases listed in the Attorney General’s 2008 report involves a
85
corporate defendant. ICE, which is now tasked with the mission of
antitrafficking enforcement, takes a similar approach; a recent press
79

DAUVERGNE, supra note 27, at 70; see also id. at 90-92 (providing examples regarding this distinction).
80
See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text.
81
For a summary of the cases discussed in several of these bulletins, see Chacón,
supra note 10, at 3036 n.341.
82
See ATT’Y GEN. 2008 TRAFFICKING REPORT, supra note 22, at 41 (reporting that
the Civil Rights Division and the United States Attorneys’ Offices collectively investigated a record-setting 183 trafficking cases, “charged 82 defendants in 40 cases[,] and
obtained 77 convictions” in fiscal year 2008).
83
See id. app. B at 83-86.
84
Id. For a description of the three possible exceptions—United States v. Webster,
United States v. Corliss, and United States v. Pepe —see id. app. B, at 85.
85
ATT’Y GEN. 2008 TRAFFICKING REPORT, supra note 22, app. B at 83-86.
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release discussing ICE antitrafficking efforts highlights two cases.
The first involved defendants Lassissi Afolabi, Akouavi Kpade Afolabi,
Derek Hounakey, and Geoffrey Kouevi, who were involved in large87
scale trafficking and smuggling activities. The second involved defendants Amador Cortes-Meza, Francisco Cortes-Meza, Raul CortesMeza, Juan Cortes-Meza, and Edison Wagner Rosa-Tort of Atlanta,
who were engaged in smuggling and trafficking activities, including
88
trafficking minors into prostitution. Both of these cases involved serious acts of trafficking. There is no doubt that the perpetrators of
such crimes deserve punishment. On the other hand, in using these
cases to highlight ICE enforcement efforts on the very page on which
ICE requests public participation in reporting trafficking, ICE primes
the public to look for—and report—a certain kind of trafficker.
The choices made by the government concerning which prosecutions to publicize may be overdetermined. A significant number of
traffickers are noncitizens. That is inevitable given the international
nature of the industry and the fact that many of the vulnerable populations subject to exploitation live in developing countries. Moreover,
some traffickers operating in the United States are noncitizens—
including coethnics who exploit individuals in their own communities
who lack legal status.
At the same time, it is clear that there must be a broader market
for the services provided by trafficked workers and that middle-class
citizens of all backgrounds are implicated in exploitation. The
antitrafficking law very clearly provides tools for prosecuting those
who knowingly profit from trafficked labor—a provision that ought to
allow for a prosecution strategy that targets demand more effectively.
For example, many well-known corporations have profited from the
89
low cost of vulnerable migrant labor forces. While these companies
86

ICE Press Release, supra note 72.
Id.
88
Id.
89
See, e.g., Sherri Day, Jury Clears Tyson Foods in Use of Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 2003, at A14 (noting that Tyson managers were exonerated in a jury trial but
including concessions from one defendant that “there were people at Tyson who had
done things wrong” in hiring unauthorized workers, although “he and the other two
men charged had no knowledge of what their colleagues were doing”); Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart to Pay U.S. $11 Million in Lawsuit on Immigrant Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
19, 2005, at A1 (discussing Wal-Mart’s settlement with the federal government regarding accusations it employed illegal immigrants to clean its stores); Julia Preston, Child
Labor Charges Are Sought Against Kosher Meat Plant in Iowa, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at
A15 (discussing widespread labor violations at a meatpacking plant that was the site of
a massive immigration enforcement raid in May 2008).
87
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and their executives have sometimes been fined in connection with
90
immigration violations and other criminal matters, none has had to
face trafficking penalties.
Antitrafficking policy at the state level appears to follow the same
patterns as federal antitrafficking prosecutions, though the data available at the state level are sparser than at the federal level. In spite of a
huge wave of antitrafficking legislation enacted at the state level over
91
the past decade, very few individuals have been prosecuted for violat92
ing state antitrafficking laws. Of the few who have been prosecuted,
available evidence suggests that they tend to be individuals prosecuted
93
for sex trafficking (usually of children). Many state officials maintain
94
that they do not believe that trafficking is an issue in their jurisdiction.
As officials have worked to train individuals to recognize trafficking situations, the training internalizes the message that trafficking is
perpetrated by foreign criminal organizations and is best solved
95
through aggressive policing at the border. Framing trafficking as a
90

For a compelling discussion of the inefficacy of these relatively low and infrequently imposed fines, see generally Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of
Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193.
91
For a list of recently enacted state laws concerning trafficking, see note 164. See
also HEATHER J. CLAWSON ET AL., ICF INT’L, PROSECUTING HUMAN TRAFFICKING CASES:
LESSONS LEARNED AND PROMISING PRACTICES 4 (2008), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/223972.pdf (noting that, at that time, thirty states and U.S. territories had enacted statutes for prosecuting human trafficking).
92
Of the seventy-seven state officials surveyed by Clawson et al., only seven percent—or about five officials—had prosecuted trafficking cases, although “some” mentioned referrals to federal officials. Id. at 23-24.
93
See, e.g., Jackson v. State, No. 103-0091, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 1316, at *10
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2003) (affirming the conviction of a defendant under the preTVPA provision of a statute prohibiting the promotion of prostitution of a minor);
State v. Daugherty, 744 S.W.2d 849, 851-54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming the conviction of a defendant for sex trafficking under a pre-TVPA provision criminalizing the
purchase of a child for adoption); Buggs v. State, No. 05-07-00676, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 1499, at *15-17 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2008) (affirming convictions for trafficking in
persons, aggravated kidnapping, and compelling prostitution in a case involving the
long-running forced prostitution of a fourteen-year-old victim who met the defendant at
a bus stop). But see Ramos v. State, No. 13-06-00646, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 7837, at *210 (Tex. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2009) (affirming the conviction of a defendant under a state
trafficking offense for using threats regarding immigration status to coerce two women
from Mexico to work without compensation at an adult daycare center).
94
See CLAWSON ET AL., supra note 91, at 23 (reporting that sixty-eight percent of
prosecutors surveyed did not consider human trafficking to be a problem in their jurisdiction).
95
See, e.g., The Rise of the Mexican Drug Cartels and U.S. National Security: Hearing Before
the H. Oversight & Government Reform Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Todd
Owen, Acting Deputy Assistant Comm’r, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security), available at http://oversight.
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crime perpetrated by foreigners both fits within and fuels a popular
96
discourse in which the noncitizen is perceived as a criminal threat.
The image of trafficking as a foreign evil perpetrated by minorities
and migrants has at least two collateral effects that actually complicate
rather than complement antitrafficking efforts. First, it fuels a problematic notion of the noncitizen as criminal threat, which in turn has
policy implications that actually undercut trafficking protections.
Second, this approach leaves the large demand for trafficked labor
unaffected and unnamed. Each of these issues is discussed in turn.
First, this approach fuels exaggerated public perceptions of the
97
noncitizen as a criminal or terrorist. It is quite efficient as a policy
matter to focus on trafficking cases involving defendants who are generally unwelcome in the polity to begin with and who are unlikely to
be able to mount effective defenses. It is certainly easier than prosecuting companies with teams of lawyers or defendants who might
garner more sympathy than the noncitizens they have exploited. Unhouse.gov/images/stories/documents/20090708190119.pdf (describing antitrafficking
efforts at the border and characterizing them as complementary to DHS’s “Secure
Border Initiative”); Law Enforcement Responses to Mexican Drug Cartels: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Congress 3-4 (2009)
(statement of Terry Goddard, Att’y Gen. of the State of Arizona) (discussing human
trafficking as one of a number of problems that can be combated through interagency
investigations, raids, and prosecutions in the border region); Randall Mikkelsen, Obama Mexico Border Plan Not Enough—U.S. Senator, REUTERS, Mar. 25, 2009, http://
www.reuters.com/article/idUSN25352630 (reporting Senator Joseph Lieberman’s
complaint that the President’s border initiative was insufficient and that he would “try
to quickly pass funding to hire 1,600 more Customs and Border Patrol agents and extra immigration officers, build up law enforcement centers and fight human trafficking”); cf. 155 CONG. REC. H5258, H5258-60 (daily ed. May 6, 2009) (containing discussion of H.R. Res. 14, 111th Cong. (2009), a resolution “recognizing the importance of
the Border Patrol in combating human smuggling,” in which members frequently used
“smuggling” and “trafficking” interchangeably—for example, Representative Cohen
characterized trafficking as a form of smuggling—and asserted that border apprehensions and prosecutions of “traffickers” are the key to ending trafficking).
96
See infra note 98. Several authors have also noted that the rise of white victims
has been an important counterpoint to this racialized portrait of traffickers. See, e.g.,
DAUVERGNE, supra note 27, at 74; Jacqueline Berman, (Un)Popular Strangers and Crises
(Un)Bounded: Discourses of Sex-Trafficking, the European Political Community and the Panicked State of the Modern State, 9 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 37, 60-62 (2003) (discussing political
implications of the race and gender of victims); Kamala Kempadoo, The Migrant
Tightrope: Experiences from the Caribbean (discussing the relevance of race in the sex
trade), in GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION 124, 130-31
(Kamala Kempadoo & Jo Doezema eds., 1998).
97
See Chacón, supra note 4, at 1835-56 (discussing how noncitizens—particularly
unauthorized migrants—have been constructed as criminal and national security
threats). For a discussion of the links drawn between antitrafficking and antiterrorism
measures, see infra note 115 and accompanying text.
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fortunately, presenting trafficking as a product of certain nefarious
noncitizens reinforces problematic notions of the noncitizen as inhe98
rently more criminally inclined than her citizen counterparts. It also
reinforces the flawed notion that the solution to the trafficking problem is simply to keep migrants out of the country.
Moreover, as a matter of public messaging, such efforts actually
hinder efforts to humanize and make a case for assisting victims of
trafficking. Traffickers are portrayed as perpetrators of a “special evil”
99
akin to terrorism. This characterization makes it more difficult to
conceive of ordinary citizens and corporations as perpetrators of trafficking; trafficking is, in this account, a crime that outsiders who pose
100
unique threats to public safety commit. Yet reliance on the trope of
the dangerous noncitizen fuels policies that actually complicate antitrafficking efforts. Citizen fears of migrants as criminals fuel a drive
101
Such policies can frufor more restrictionist immigration policies.
98

Numerous studies have pointed to the gap between public perception and actual data on this question. See, e.g., Matthew T. Lee et al., Does Immigration Increase Homicide? Negative Evidence from Three Border Cities, 42 SOC. Q. 559, 560, 571-74 (2001)
(concluding that there is no correlation between recent immigration and higher crime
rates); Rubén G. Rumbaut et al., Debunking the Myth of Immigrant Criminality: Imprisonment Among First- and Second-Generation Young Men, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE, June
2006, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=403 (“In the absence of rigorous empirical research, myths and stereotypes about immigrants and
crime often provide the underpinnings for public policies and practices . . . .”); Robert
J. Sampson, Open Doors Don’t Invite Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at A15
(“[E]vidence points to increased immigration as a major factor associated with the
lower crime rate of the 1990s . . . .”); Kristin F. Butcher & Anne Morrison Piehl, Recent
Immigrants: Unexpected Implications for Crime and Incarceration 4-11 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6067, 1997) (suggesting reasons why immigrant
institutionalization rates lag behind native institutionalization rates); see also Eyal Press,
Do Immigrants Make Us Safer?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2006, at E20 (describing the existing
scholarship addressing this topic).
99
See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Statement to the United Nations General
Assembly (Sept. 23, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/
usaeng030923.htm (addressing the “special evil” of trafficking in the context of remarks aimed at the threat of global terrorism).
100
See, e.g., Pushing the Border Out on Alien Smuggling: New Tools and Intelligence Initiatives: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security and Claims of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 33 (2004) (statement of John P. Torres, Deputy Assistant Director, Smuggling and Public Safety, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security) [hereinafter Pushing the Border Out
Hearing] (“[W]e recognize that human smuggling and trafficking into the United
States constitute a significant risk to national security and public safety.”).
101
For example, The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), an organization that “advocates a temporary moratorium on all immigration except spouses
and minor children of U.S. citizens and a limited number of refugees,” FAIR: About
Comprehensive Immigration Reform, http://www.fairus.org/site/PageNavigator/about
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strate the goal of protecting migrants who are victims of trafficking
not only because they cast all migrants as undesirable but also because
they feed the very policies that have helped to make trafficking possible and profitable. Traffickers will continue to supply laborers to
102
markets that cannot be satisfied through lawful channels.
Second, this focus can deflect attention from the demands that
create a market for trafficking. As the California legislature has recently worked to acknowledge, trafficking does not occur in the ab103
sence of markets.
Truly effective antitrafficking efforts need to
identify which products and services trafficked workers provide and
must involve strategies to curb demand for those products and services. Curbing demand must include prosecution of those who profit
from trafficking labor, even when those individuals and companies do
not fit the convenient profile of the paradigmatic individual, noncitizen trafficker. Current antitrafficking enforcement discourse focuses
almost exclusively on targeting supply networks, while deemphasizing
the demand side of the equation in the market for trafficked persons—whether for sex, cheaply produced goods, or agricultural labor.
Criminal prosecutions aimed at the demand side of the trafficking
problem are virtually nonexistent.
Ultimately, punishing individuals who supply trafficked labor to
the market is, without question, a worthwhile goal. But efforts to punish traffickers should include systematic efforts to include punishment that targets the demand side. Currently, not only are the profiteers of trafficked human labor frequently underpunished, but the
pattern of prosecutions that is actually highlighted in the promotional
materials put forth by the Department of Justice and ICE helps to
(follow “Our Purpose” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 15, 2010), places “illegal immigration” and “crime” at the very top of the page of “immigration issues” covered, FAIR:
Immigration Issue Center, http://www.fairus.org/site/PageNavigator/issues (last visited Apr. 15, 2010), and provides a list of crimes committed by noncitizens as an argument in favor of immigration restrictions, FAIR: Examples of Serious Crimes of
Illegal Aliens, http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=research_seriouscrime
(last visited Apr. 15, 2010). For a discussion of how the threat of migrant criminality was
used as part of the campaign in favor of California’s Proposition 187, see Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and California’s Proposition 187:
The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV. 629, 654 (1995).
102
See Neha Misra, The Push & Pull of Globalization: How the Global Economy Makes
Migrant Workers Vulnerable to Exploitation, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Spring 2007, at 2, 2-3 (arguing that where labor-market needs are unmet, “profit potential is much higher” for
those employing trafficked workers than for those utilizing local labor).
103
See, e.g., Everyone’s Business: California’s Role in Combating Human Rights Violations
in Product Supply Chains: Joint Informational Hearing of the S. Comm. on Labor and Industrial Relations and the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 2009–2010 Leg. (Cal. 2009).
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stoke misunderstandings of the nature of the trafficking problem.
Framing the trafficking problem as one that is the sole responsibility
of noncitizens and outsiders fits comfortably within the larger narrative that has been constructed around unauthorized migration.
This construction of the trafficking problem also indirectly justifies another policy outcome that is actually disadvantageous to
antitrafficking efforts: the criminalization of the smuggled migrant.
As previously noted, the successful passage of the TVPA depended on
the creation of a clear legal distinction between criminals who violate
104
the immigration law and victims of trafficking. To a certain extent,
this is unavoidable, and it is not inherently catastrophic for the protection of migrants’ rights, provided that the resulting legal treatment of
105
smuggled migrants comports with human rights norms. In drafting
the Palermo Protocol, the human rights community was preoccupied
with the desire to ensure that smuggled migrants were not unduly
106
criminalized as a result.
Unfortunately, in the United States, the smuggled migrant has
107
been subject to intense criminalization in recent years.
Policymakers have given the enforcement of immigration restrictions a very high
priority, and in this equation, smuggled migrants are subject to ex-

104

See supra text accompanying notes 14-28. For a refutation of the notion that
there is a clear distinction between trafficking and smuggling, see, for example, BRIDGET ANDERSON & JULIA O’CONNELL DAVIDSON, IS TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS DEMAND DRIVEN? A MULTI-COUNTRY PILOT STUDY 9 (2003); Chacón, supra note 10, at
3021-24; Gallagher, supra note 38, at 1000; Haynes, supra note 11, at 70.
105
See Gallagher, supra note 1, at 790, 792 (noting the need for clear legal definitions, while also noting that to a certain extent the distinction rests on a “strange legal
fiction”).
106
See id. at 790-91 (“Our focus . . . remained squarely on ensuring that drafters
did not endorse criminalization of smuggled migrants . . . .”).
107
See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the
Post-September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639, 640 (2004) (considering “convergence between the immigration and criminal justice systems”); Stephen
H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice
Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 471-72 (2007) (“[I]mmigration law has been absorbing the theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities of the criminal enforcement model
while rejecting the criminal adjudication model in favor of a civil regulatory regime.”);
Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 83-86 (2005) (describing consequences of the interaction between criminal justice and immigration law); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship &
Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 616-20
(2003) (describing the use of the phrase “criminalization of immigration law”); Juliet
Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV.
367, 376-77 (2006) (noting the rise of “crimmigration law”).
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tremely harsh penalties under the criminal law, and to highly puni109
tive policies under civil immigration law. Treatment of migrants is
thus increasingly dichotomous: either a noncitizen qualifies as a trafficking victim, in which case she can avail herself of human rights protections under the TVPA, or the noncitizen is a smuggled migrant,
who is subject to detention, prosecution, criminal punishment, and
removal. If an individual falls in a gray area—between an outright victim of “severe” trafficking and a smuggled migrant who is subject to
everyday forms of labor exploitation—the government’s approach has
been to treat the gray-area case as one involving a voluntary migrant
110
who is not eligible for the protections available to trafficking victims.
In some ways, the growing chasm between the treatment of trafficked victims and all other unauthorized migrants further fuels policies that limit the official scope of trafficking prosecutions. If a
broader range of exploitative practices were highlighted, where appropriate, and prosecuted by the government, two things would become immediately clear. The first is that mainstream companies and
individuals benefit from trafficked labor, directly and indirectly. An
understanding of this complicity could lead to more rational discussions regarding issues of labor and migration. The second is that a
broader range of victims would be entitled to protections than is currently the practice. Providing more individuals with legal protections
and benefits would have the advantage of undermining the exploitative labor practices that have been allowed to thrive at the unpoliced
111
intersection of labor law and immigration law. Instead, the “special”
108

See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 5, at 135 & n.2 (citing authorities noting the trend
in “increasingly harsh criminal consequences”).
109
See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 107, at 482-86 (summarizing consequences criminal convictions have on immigration status).
110
See generally Srikantiah, supra note 19, at 191-95 (exploring how the government
envisions an “iconic victim” to distinguish between voluntary migrants and trafficking
victims); Kathleen Kim, The Coercion of Trafficked Workers, 95 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming
2010) (manuscript at 32, on file with author) (noting that the Department of Justice
tends to focus its efforts on cases involving direct physical force or restraint, and that
few prosecuted cases involve other forms of coercion, despite the TVPA’s broad definition of the term). This problem is compounded when courts apply the TVPA standard
of coercion in an overly narrow fashion, thereby excluding a broad range of coerced
conduct that the TVPA actually protects. See Ivy Lee, Appellate Brief, An Appeal of a T Visa Denial, 14 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 455 (2007) (narrating the denial of a T Visa
for a trafficking victim subject to nonphysical coercion); Kim, supra (manuscript at 31)
(discussing courts’ overly narrow reading of “coercion” in post-TVPA trafficking cases).
111
Recent developments in immigration law have undermined the protections of
the labor law regime in cases involving unauthorized migrants, thereby ironically providing employers with even more monetary incentives to hire unauthorized workers.
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nature of the harm of trafficking is highlighted and attributed to foreign forces. This depiction in turn gives rise to further “evidence” in
112
support of widespread misperceptions of migrant criminality, thus
justifying the very border-control efforts that may, ironically, give traf113
fickers more business.
II. ANTITRAFFICKING ENFORCEMENT AND THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF MIGRATION
The previous Part explored the ways in which current antitrafficking strategies have the potential to fuel misperceptions concerning
migrant criminality. In turn, this discourse justifies restrictionist migration policies and laws that criminalize smuggled migrants. This
Part traces out the manifestations of the discourse on the ground. In
particular, this Part explores the ways in which antitrafficking efforts
have been used to justify a prosecution-centered approach not only to
antitrafficking efforts but to all immigration policy.

See Catherine L. Fisk & Michael J. Wishnie, Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB: The Rules of the Workplace for Undocumented Immigrants (describing the tensions
between immigration and labor law), in IMMIGRATION STORIES 311, 311-12 (David A.
Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005); Ruben J. Garcia, Toward Fundamental Change for
the Protection of Low-Wage Workers: The “Workers’ Rights Are Human Rights” Debate in the
Obama Era, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 421, 422-24 (arguing that the current labor law statutory scheme is flawed because it divides workers into categories and is “changeable,
malleable, and politically contingent”); Saucedo, supra note 13, at 893-903 (discussing
how recent government activity reinforced immigrant community fears and forced undocumented workers “deeper into the shadows”); Wishnie, supra note 90, at 195
(“[T]he prohibition on [undocumented-immigrant] employment . . . in fact has led to
increased workplace exploitation of undocumented immigrants, strengthened the
‘jobs magnet’ that sanctions aimed to weaken, encouraged illegal immigration, and
eroded wages and working conditions for U.S. workers.”).
112
See Jennifer M. Chacón, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal of the
“Criminal Street Gang Member,” 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 348-49 (discussing ways in
which migrants are perceived as criminals and how those perceptions increase support
for harsh immigration laws). For information on actual rates of migrant criminality,
see Rumbaut et al., supra note 98, which finds that immigrants have lower rates of
criminal convictions than native-born Americans.
113
See Hathaway, supra note 1, at 34 (“Simply put, the agreement of states to criminalize smuggling and to strengthen border control efforts, coupled with inelastic
demand for border crossing by mostly less-than-wealthy persons, will logically create
the conditions within which traditionally benign forms of smuggling are transmuted
into the clearly rights-abusive practices characteristic of trafficking.”); see also Pushing
the Border Out Hearing, supra note 100, at 40 (statement of John P. Torres) (explaining
that ICE’s antitrafficking strategy is to “dismantle the criminal and terrorist organizations that smuggle or traffic in people” and to apply “a vast array of investigative methodologies in the fight against both criminal and terrorist organizations as well as the infrastructure that supports their activities in the United States and around the world”).
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An immigration strategy that relies heavily on the criminalization
of migrants undercuts antitrafficking goals. Section II.A explores the
complex interaction between the increased border enforcement that
has been justified in part on antitrafficking grounds and the actual effects of these policies on trafficking. Section II.B explores state and
local participation in antitrafficking efforts and explains that while
these efforts can bolster federal efforts, they also map onto certain restrictionist polices that are in tension with antitrafficking goals. For
this reason, the development of state antitrafficking strategies, like any
other antitrafficking effort situated in a broader context of highly restrictionist enforcement efforts, may actually prove to be a mixed
blessing for migrant trafficking victims.
A. Border Control Policy as Antitrafficking Policy
One of the most consistent themes sounded over the past decade
by government officials charged with “homeland security” has been
the need to increase “border security.” Although the term was almost
never used prior to 2001, “border security” has become a catchphrase
that encompasses a range of security-related goals, including immigration control, customs screening of goods and people, and more exact114
ing (usually biometric) document requirements.
Government officials frequently have mentioned antitrafficking
115
efforts within the context of border security. Antitrafficking is generally listed as one of a number of objectives that officials hope to
achieve through an increased law enforcement presence at the border. In this sense, trafficking in persons, like drug trafficking or human smuggling, is presented as a problem that exists largely because
of insufficient personnel and monitoring along the border.
It is certainly true that some international trafficking occurs like
other forms of unauthorized migration: individuals lacking legal authorization to enter the country are transported across the border surreptitiously or using fraudulent documents. To a certain extent, a
greater (and better trained) force along the border could stop some
trafficking at the international border.
On the other hand, much of the human trafficking that occurs in
the contemporary context could easily avert even the most stringently
staffed borders. Some victims have legitimate visas that allow them
114

See Chacón, supra note 4, at 1853-54 (discussing post–September 11 use of the
phrase “border security”).
115
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 95.
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116

entry. Others have facially valid but fraudulent visas that have been
117
obtained for them by traffickers. Thus, for some migrants, it is only
after they have entered the country that the person responsible for
their transportation or their later employment is able to exploit vulnerabilities in their legal and economic status, and the relationship
118
changes to one of trafficking victim and trafficker.
This is significant because solutions to the trafficking problem depend on correctly identifying the nature of that problem. To date,
government officials charged with eradicating trafficking have made a
number of statements suggesting that they understand the trafficking
problem as best solved by attacking criminal smuggling networks. For
example, in his remarks at a human trafficking symposium in the fall
of 2008, then–Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff stated,
Let me be clear about this: the line between so-called voluntary migration and human trafficking is not a very bold line. It is often the case
that people who begin the movement across borders in a voluntary way,
because they want to come across in order to get work for themselves,
quickly turn into victims when they are held for ransom, or when they
are required to work off the cost of the smuggling by paying off the vast
majority of their wages to smuggling organizations. Therefore, by cracking down on illegal migration, we are actually cracking down on the kind
of network activity, which actually facilitates human trafficking and vic119
timization, as well.

Much of this statement is incontrovertible. First, Mr. Chertoff correctly acknowledges that there is no bright line that separates smuggling

116

This is the situation of the plaintiffs in the case against Signal International,
who held valid H-2B visas but thought that they would be provided with permanent
visas and allegedly were exploited by the employer who made those promises. See Julia
Preston, Suit Points to Guest Worker Program Flaws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, at A12. Interestingly, the plaintiffs in the Signal International case also allege that “[i]mmigration
authorities worked closely with [the] company . . . to discourage protests by temporary
guest workers from India over their job conditions, including advising managers to
send some workers back to India.” Id.
117
See LIANA SUN WYLER, ALISON SISKIN & CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RES.
SERV., TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS: U.S. POLICY AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5 (2009) (explaining how traffickers use false documents to transport women lured by false promises of jobs, study, or travel opportunities).
118
See id. (“After providing transportation and false documents to get victims to
their destination, [traffickers] subsequently charge exorbitant fees for those services,
often creating life-time debt bondage.”).
119
Michael Chertoff, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Remarks at the Stop Human
Trafficking Symposium (Sept. 9, 2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/
speeches/sp_1221053062406.shtm.
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from trafficking. Instead, situations involving smuggled migrants are
fluid and can change to trafficking over time, depending on circumstances. Second, his remarks pinpoint the fact that unauthorized or
smuggled migrants suffer from legal and economic vulnerabilities that
render them susceptible to trafficking. Third, he notes that some of
the players involved in smuggling migrants are also involved in trafficking—a statement that is undoubtedly true in some cases, although Mr.
Chertoff makes no effort to make a precise statement as to the degree
of overlap. He merely notes that these individuals use the same “kind
of network activity.” Finally, he states that the large debts that migrants
frequently accrue to their smugglers put smuggling networks in a position to exploit smuggled migrants through debt bondage. Unfortunately, while the statement recognizes the nuanced nature of the trafficking problem, the proposed solution is not equally nuanced. In the
120
end, the Secretary proposes “cracking down on illegal migration.”
Efforts to “crack down on illegal migration” have been on a rapid
rise since the mid-1990s. Over the past six years—and on the watch of
administrations from two different political parties—immigration en121
forcement has ballooned.
Government spending on border enforcement and interior enforcement is at its highest level in history.
The number of individuals formally removed each year reached a
record high in 2009, and the current Administration is on course to
122
set yet another record this year.
The government is also prosecuting more immigration offenses
123
than ever before. Indeed, immigration crimes now make up half of
124
the federal criminal docket —the vast majority of these offenses are
125
unlawful entry and, to a lesser extent, felony reentry.
Smuggling
120

Id.
See Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention?: Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1565-66 (2010)
(“Never before in the history of the United States has the government removed so
many noncitizens in so short a time frame.”).
122
Id.
123
See Chacón, supra note 5, at 139 (“After remaining relatively flat in the period
from 1986 to 1996, the number of immigration prosecutions almost quadrupled over
the next ten years.”).
124
See Schwartz, supra note 7 (reporting a nearly nine-percent increase in federal
immigration prosecutions in fiscal year 2009 from previous years); see also TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, FY 2009 FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS SHARPLY
HIGHER (2009), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/223 (indicating that, in fiscal
year 2009, immigration prosecutions comprised fifty-four percent of all federal filings).
125
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, IMMIGRATION PROSECUTIONS AT RECORD LEVELS IN FY 2009 (2009), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/
121
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and trafficking prosecutions are a miniscule subset of total prosecu126
tions. Trafficking offenses do not even make the list of the top ten
127
categories of immigration prosecutions.
If “cracking down on illegal migration” truly reduces trafficking,
128
as Secretary Chertoff’s remarks suggest, then the increase in removals and prosecutions discussed above would be an effective means of
reducing trafficking. For a variety of reasons, however, it is unlikely
that such a direct line between immigration enforcement and trafficking eradication exists.
Indeed, in some ways, the efforts to “crack down on illegal migration” might actually facilitate trafficking. First, efforts to crack down
on illegal migration in the workplace have left undocumented mi129
grants more—not less—vulnerable to exploitation.
Second, efforts
to prosecute large numbers of first-time illegal entrants have overwhelmed resources along the southern border, diverting law enforcement resources from more serious crimes—including traffick130
ing—in favor of securing thousands of easy plea convictions.
Third, because increased border enforcement has not stopped the
flow of unauthorized migration but has simply made it more difficult
and more costly, these efforts have exacerbated the dynamic, identi131
fied by Secretary Chertoff in his speech, whereby smugglers exploit
the migrants who have made contractual arrangements with them.
One thing that seems clear about recent border-enforcement efforts is
that they have made cross-border movement more difficult, and con132
Presumably, people are more likely to turn
sequently, more costly.

reports/218 (providing a summary of data on immigration prosecutions from the first
nine months of fiscal year 2009).
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Chertoff, supra note 119.
129
See, e.g., Saucedo, supra note 13, at 892 (providing an overview of the U visa and
its implications for undocumented workers); see also Chacón, supra note 10, at 2980
(suggesting that the TVPA’s exclusion of a broad range of labor exploitation from its
reach exacerbates workplace exploitation).
130
See, e.g., JOANNA LYDGATE, THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE,
ETHNICITY & DIVERSITY, ASSEMBLY-LINE JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF OPERATION STREAMLINE
1-3 (2010), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf
(analyzing the effectiveness of Operation Streamline, a program that “requires the
federal criminal prosecution and imprisonment of all unlawful border crossers,” as a
border-security measure).
131
Chertoff, supra note 119.
132
See Andreas, supra note 4, at 116 (noting that the increased risks of crossing the
border have led to a rise in the price of being smuggled); Khalid Koser, Why Migrant

2010]

Tensions and Trade-offs

1641
133

to professionals—smugglers—to assist them in crossing the border.
Smuggled migrants are now more likely to owe money to their smug134
glers and more likely to try to pay off this debt with labor after entry.
This increases the chances that smuggling relationships will transform
135
into trafficking relationships.
And once an individual is in a situation in which her labor is exploited, her legal vulnerability is exacerbated by contemporary policies that criminalize migrants.
If such individuals could be comfortable knowing that they would
be identified as trafficking victims and offered legal and social protection, such exploitation would not persist. But these individuals fall
within a gray area in which they are more likely to be identified as “illegal aliens” than “trafficking victims.” Given the current “crackdown”
on “illegal immigrants,” it is not at all surprising that such individuals
136
would be very much afraid to seek official or unofficial assistance.
In short, although the Secretary may be right that smugglers and traffickers rely on the same networks, it does not necessarily follow that
“cracking down” on unauthorized migrants is the best way to combat
the trafficking problem.
Genuine efforts to address trafficking should focus at least as
much attention on workplace conditions as on smuggling networks,
Smuggling Pays, INT’L MIGRATION, June 2008, at 3 (providing data on the financing of
smuggling in Afghanistan and Pakistan).
133
See David Kyle & Rey Koslowski, Introduction to GLOBAL HUMAN SMUGGLING, supra
note 4, at 1, 22; Raimo Väyrynen, Illegal Immigration, Human Trafficking, and Organized
Crime 2-7, 20 (World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 2003/72, 2003),
available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/discussion-papers/
2003/en_GB/dp2003-072/files/78091733799863273/default/dp2003-072.pdf (“To be
able to cross the border, illegal immigrants may need the help of professional smugglers and their assistants.”). Hathaway laments the lack of good data on this point. See
Hathaway, supra note 1, at 32 n.187 (“There is, however, a paucity of hard data to show
a clear correlation between heightened border controls and increased human smuggling and/or trafficking.”).
134
See, e.g., Guido Friebel & Sergei Guriev, Smuggling Humans: A Theory of DebtFinanced Migration, 4 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1085, 1107-08 (2006) (noting that increased
border protection leads to increased debt-financed migration, even where overall unauthorized migration decreases).
135
See Jacqueline Bhabha, Lone Travelers: Rights, Criminalization, and the Transnational Migration of Unaccompanied Children, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 269, 285
(2000) (noting that trafficked persons consent to migration with little knowledge of
the potential coercive post-migration situation); David A. Feingold, Human Trafficking,
FOREIGN POL’Y, Sept.–Oct. 2005, at 26, 27 (arguing that some measures designed to
protect women might make them more vulnerable to traffickers); Hathaway, supra
note 1, at 33-34 (“[D]esperate people determined to migrate will need smugglers more
than ever.”).
136
For a discussion of the ways in which government enforcement efforts fuel migrant fear, see Saucedo, supra note 13, and supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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and should target the employers of unauthorized workers more heavily than it targets the workers. That has not been the nature of the
U.S. crackdown on unauthorized migration. Workplace raids have led
to the massive removal of workers in many more cases than they have
137
resulted in the prosecution of those who exploit migrant laborers.
As such, it seems just as likely that the crackdown will fuel some trafficking even as it eradicates certain instances of it through the targeting and prosecution of some smuggling networks.
If the relationship between immigration enforcement and antitrafficking efforts is so complex, why is the former so often cited as a
direct means to the latter? Certainly, there is an appealing superficial
logic to the claims. Furthermore, the ability to invoke the plight of
the unfortunate trafficking victim to justify immigration enforcement
puts a human face on both sides of an equation that otherwise seems
to pit the economically disadvantaged migrant against the large and
unsympathetic state. The invocation of trafficking as a driving force
behind immigration enforcement puts a human rights gloss on a border-enforcement model that, in fact, raises a number of serious hu138
man rights concerns.
It is the very weakening of the human rights
orientation of migration policy—such as the erosion of refugee protections—that increases the market for international trafficking. But
these connections are elided by policy statements that emphasize an
equation where more enforcement means less trafficking.
137

See Saucedo, supra note 13, at 896-98 (describing the effect of ICE raids on
workplaces); see also Wishnie, supra note 90, at 195 (arguing that the “employer sanctions regime” has resulted in increased exploitation of immigrant workers); Spencer S.
Hsu, For the Record: Immigration, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2008, at A13 (“While federal immigration authorities arrested nearly four times as many people at workplaces in 2007
as they did in 2005[,] . . . [o]nly 92 owners, supervisors or hiring officials were arrested
in an economy that includes 6 million companies that employ more than 7 million unauthorized workers.”), in William Branigin, Sebelius Conciliatory in Democrats’ Response to
Bush Address, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2008, at A13. The large Agriprocessors, Inc. raid is
a case in point. Although about 300 noncitizens were arrested and removed in those
raids, the owner of the plant ultimately did not face prosecution on any immigrationrelated charges. See Iowa: Immigration Charges Dropped in Raid Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2009, at A20.
138
See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO
RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 87-130 (2007) (detailing the undesirable and immoral consequences of restrictive immigration policy); see also Bill Ong
Hing, Immigration Policy: Thinking Outside the (Big) Box, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1401, 1440
(2007) (noting the “brutality inherent in enforcement of the current immigration controls, which result in physical abuse, promote racial discrimination, and relegate certain groups of U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants to second-class status,” as well as the
“[r]ampant civil rights deprivations [that] have resulted,” and concluding that “[s]uch
consequences render U.S. immigration enforcement immoral”).
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Interestingly, the same sort of pattern appears at the state level,
where some state legislatures have enacted antitrafficking legislation
not as part of a trend toward greater human rights protections for migrants but rather as part of a trend toward more state participation in
the regulation and criminalization of unauthorized migration.
B. State and Local Immigration Enforcement Through
Antitrafficking Policy?
State and local participation in immigration regulation and enforcement has been constrained by Supreme Court doctrine, dating
139
from the late nineteenth century, which declared that immigration
control is a responsibility exclusively held by the federal govern140
ment.
Courts have frequently struck down state efforts to regulate
141
immigration law and have subjected states’ efforts to distinguish
among state residents on the basis of alienage to heightened scruti142
ny, as opposed to the rational basis review applied to federal alie143
Nevertheless, states’ efforts to develop immigranage distinctions.
tion regulations have sometimes withstood court scrutiny in cases
where courts have found that a state’s efforts to regulate immigration
144
complement the federal statutory scheme.
139

Until the late nineteenth century, the states played a relatively active role in
shaping and enforcing migration policy. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE
CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 23 (1996) (discussing
state policies of banishment and conditional pardons as precursors of the federal deportation mechanism); ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY
IN THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA 2-3 (2006) (arguing that the United States had an active
immigration policy prior to the nineteenth century but that it was shaped by the states).
140
See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate immigration
is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”).
141
See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 554-55 (M.D. Pa.
2007) (striking down as unconstitutional a set of ordinances passed in the city of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, to restrict benefits and services available to noncitizens); League
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786-87 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
(striking down much of Proposition 187, an initiative passed by California voters in
1994, which sought to restrict benefits available to noncitizens).
142
See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding that state statutes
denying welfare benefits to residents violate the Equal Protection Clause); Takahashi v.
Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (“State laws which impose discriminatory burdens upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully within the United
States . . . have accordingly been held invalid.”).
143
See Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 69 (1976) (upholding federal legislation
conditioning an alien’s Medicare participation on her length of residency).
144
See, e.g., De Canas, 424 U.S. at 357-58 (declining to invalidate a California Labor
Code provision prohibiting employers from knowingly employing an unauthorized
noncitizen worker where the provision was consistent with the comprehensive federal
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Recently, state and local governments have developed a cottage
industry in direct and indirect immigration law enforcement. Over
the past five years, state and local initiatives aimed at regulating immi145
gration have proliferated throughout the United States. These initiatives have included, among other things, criminal and civil penalties
and contracting prohibitions upon employers who employ unautho146
rized migrant workers; penalties upon landlords who rent housing

statutory scheme for regulation of immigration and naturalization). More recently, the
Ninth Circuit upheld an Arizona immigration law targeting the employment of unauthorized noncitizen workers. See Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856,
866-67 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding an Arizona statute that required employers to use the
federal government’s electronic verification system for checking employees’ work authorization status, even though the federal law makes use of the system voluntary).
145
See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, IMMIGRANT POL’Y PROJECT,
STATE LAWS RELATED TO IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION IN 2008, at 1 (2009), available
at http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/documents/immig/stateImmigReportFinal2008.pdf
(noting that, in 2008, state legislatures considered at least 1305 immigration-related
laws); Ken Belson & Jill P. Capuzzo, Towns Rethink Laws Against Illegal Immigrants, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A1 (“[M]ore than 30 towns nationwide have enacted laws intended to address problems attributed to illegal immigration . . . .”). Scholarly discussions of these laws have abounded in recent years. See, e.g., Karla Mari McKanders, The
Constitutionality of State and Local Laws Targeting Immigrants, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 579, 580-81 (2009) (describing Arkansas’s anti-immigration laws as a “microcosm
of the various states across the country where state and local officials are coping with
the recent expansion of legal and unauthorized immigration”); Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for
Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 31 (noting the “torrent of state legislation” related to immigration); Huyen Pham, When Immigration Borders Move, 61 FLA. L. REV.
1115, 1118-19 (2009) (discussing increased state involvement in immigration laws);
Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH.
L. REV. 567, 569 (2008) (noting the “regulatory trend[]” of increased state participation in immigration lawmaking); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State
and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1559-60 (2008) (recognizing a
“veritable deluge” of new state and local immigration laws); Rick Su, A Localist Reading
of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1622 (2008) (discussing the increased interest of local governments in immigration laws).
146
See, e.g., Legal Arizona Workers Act § 6, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-214 (Supp.
2008) (mandating employer participation in the federal E-Verify program); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 19-11-105(b) (2007) (“No state agency may enter into or renew a public contract for services with a contractor who knows that the contractor or a subcontractor
employs or contracts with an illegal immigrant to perform work under the contract.”);
Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 8, 2006) (prohibiting businesses from hiring
unauthorized migrants), invalidated by Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477; Bruce Lambert,
Congressman Endorses Suffolk County Plan to Bar Contractors from Using Illegal Immigrants,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2006, at B3 (describing a Suffolk County, New York, bill to impose
restrictions on county contractors). The Suffolk County bill was passed into law in October. See Hauppauge: New Immigration Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2006, at B7 (reporting
that the Suffolk County executive signed the bill into law).
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to unauthorized migrants; English-only ordinances; and efforts to
149
strip unauthorized migrants of public benefits. Many states have also enacted criminal laws that mirror the federal government’s own
prohibitions on immigration-related crimes such as harboring unau150
thorized migrants, using false proof of citizenship, and trafficking.
Some municipalities have even adopted their own policies targeting
the undocumented, such as the Waukegan, Illinois, policy of automat151
ically impounding cars that belong to undocumented noncitizens.
One significant subset of these ordinances criminalizes conduct that
state and local legislators associated—whether correctly or incorrectly—with unauthorized migration. Such ordinances include the laws
that prohibit congregating in certain areas and soliciting employ-

147

See, e.g., Escondido, Cal., Ordinance 2006-38R (Oct. 18, 2006) (subjecting landlords that rent to unauthorized migrants to fines and imprisonment), permanently enjoined by Garrett v. City of Escondido, No. 06-2434 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2006); Hazleton,
Pa., Ordinance 2006-13 (Aug. 15, 2006) (requiring tenants to show proof of legal citizenship or residency to obtain the occupancy permits necessary for landlords to avoid
criminal prosecution). For the basis upon which the Escondido ordinance was originally enjoined, see Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1055-56, 1059 (S.D.
Cal. 2006), in which the court granted a temporary restraining order against the ordinance based, in part, on the likelihood of preemption by the “harboring” provisions
of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2006).
148
See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-19 (Sept. 8, 2006) (declaring that English is
the official language of Hazleton), invalidated by Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477; see also
Pham, supra note 145, at 1148 (noting that laws aimed at restricting the rights and
benefits of noncitizens are “[o]ften . . . passed together with English-only ordinances”);
cf. Keith Aoki et al., (In)visible Cities: Three Local Government Models and Immigration Regulation, 10 OR. REV. INT’L L. 453, 518-19 (2008) (observing the anti-Latino bias of English-only legislation); Richard Delgado, The Law of the Noose: A History of Latino Lynching, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 307-11 (2009) (noting the recent wave of Englishonly ordinances and discussing linkages between English-only laws promoting racial
oppression and racial violence against Latinos).
149
See Michael A. Olivas, Lawmakers Gone Wild? College Residency and the Response to
Professor Kobach, 61 SMU L. REV. 99, 101-03 (2008) (discussing state laws and policies
that deny undocumented students in-state tuition rates at public universities). Efforts
to deny public benefits to noncitizens have a rich history, which is neatly embodied in
the 1990s struggle over California’s Proposition 187. See Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 238 (2003).
150
See Olivas, supra note 149, at 101-02 (discussing laws in Georgia, Arizona, and
Hazleton, Pennsylvania); Stumpf, supra note 145, at 1598-99 (discussing examples from
Oklahoma, California, Oregon, and Wyoming). See infra note 164 for a list of state
antitrafficking legislation.
151
See Catharine Slack, Municipal Targeting of Undocumented Immigrants’ Travel in the
Post 9/11 Suburbs: Waukegan, Illinois Case Study, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 485, 488-91 (2008)
(describing Waukegan’s ordinance requiring that undocumented immigrants’ cars be
towed).
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152

ment.
These laws take aim at “day laborers” and rest on the prob153
lematic assumption that all day laborers are unauthorized workers.
154
Scholars have split on the question of the constitutionality, not
155
to mention the desirability, of state and local immigration regulation. Courts also have reached divergent conclusions on the constitutionality of such state and local immigration-related ordinances.
Some courts have concluded that these ordinances impermissibly encroach upon the field of immigration, which is to be occupied solely
156
Other courts have struck down certain
by the federal government.
ordinances on the more limited grounds that they are inconsistent
152

See, e.g., Victor Narro, Impacting Next Wave Organizing: Creative Campaign Strategies
of the Los Angeles Worker Centers, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 465, 490-95 (2005–2006) (discussing such ordinances in Redondo Beach and Los Angeles); Press Release, Mexican Am.
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, MALDEF, ACLU/SC and NDLON File Lawsuit Challenging
City of Costa Mesa’s Anti-Solicitation Ordinance (Feb. 2, 2010), available at http://
maldef.org/news/releases/maldef_aclusc_and_ndlon_file_02022010 (discussing lawsuit
against antisolicitation ordinance aimed at day laborers, among others); see also Cent.
Am. Refugee Ctr. v. City of Glen Cove, 753 F. Supp. 437, 439-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1990)
(upholding against equal protection and First Amendment challenges local antisolicitation ordinances that prevented day laborers from congregating).
153
See Robin Finn, Town Divides over Law Aimed at Day Laborers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27,
2009, at NJ1 (describing a day-laborer law in Oyster Bay, New York); see also Lopez v.
Town of Cave Creek, Ariz., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1035-36 (D. Ariz. 2008) (granting a
preliminary injunction against a Cave Creek ordinance aimed at day-laborer solicitation); Order Denying Motion to Suppress and Motion to Terminate Removal Proceedings, In re Sanchez, File No. 98-300-503, at 6 (Dep’t of Justice Immig. Ct. Jan. 31, 2008)
(“[T]he solicitation of day labor in our current culture has a strong correlation to undocumented presence in the United States and lack of employment authorization.”).
154
Compare Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism,
61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 792 (2008) (challenging the traditional belief that there is a
“constitutional mandate for federal exclusivity over pure immigration law”), with
Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 987
(2004) (stating that the Framers intended for power over immigration to be “exclusively federal”), and Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration
Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 530-58 (2001)
(“[I]mmigration power is an exclusively federal power which Congress may not, by statute, devolve to the states.”).
155
Compare Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority
of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 181 (2005) (contending
that assistance from local police can lead to successful immigration law enforcement),
and Rodríguez, supra note 145, at 593-94 (discussing why local communities think passing local immigration laws is beneficial), with Pham, supra note 154, at 981-86 (describing problems that arise from local involvement in immigration laws), and Wishnie, supra note 154, at 567 (noting the “desirability of preserving the vitality of the equality
norms that have for over a century shielded noncitizens from state and local bigotry”).
156
See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 78687 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that the sections of Proposition 187 that occupied the
immigration field controlled by federal law are preempted).
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with existing federal statutes regulating immigration.
Still other
courts have upheld state and local ordinances, finding these schemes
158
Where
in harmony with federal efforts to regulate immigration.
criminal law is concerned, because states and localities—rather than
the federal government—have historically served as the locus of crim159
inal regulation, federal courts have sometimes been surprisingly will160
ing to defer to such local regulation of crime.
State and local ordinances aimed at managing migration raise important concerns about the rights of immigrant communities. These
ordinances put state and local law enforcement agents in the business
161
of policing immigration as part of their core mission.
Because removal is often a possible sanction for noncitizens arrested in the
course of enforcing these laws, the procedural gap between the rights
and remedies available to noncitizens in civil (as opposed to criminal)
immigration proceedings may create a situation in which local law enforcement agents funnel noncitizens into the civil removal system to
avoid possible sanctions—such as suppression or disciplinary actions—
162
that might result if the same matter is brought in criminal courts.
163
More aggressive policing of immigrant communities may result.
Over the past six years, almost every state has enacted antitraffick164
ing legislation. This flurry of state legislation is, in part, a reflection
157

See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d
858, 879 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (“Because Farmers Branch has attempted to regulate immigration differently from the federal government, the Ordinance is preempted by the
Supremacy Clause.”); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 554-55 (M.D.
Pa. 2007) (concluding that Hazleton may not “disrupt a carefully drawn federal statutory scheme”).
158
See, e.g., Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 866-67 (9th
Cir. 2009) (holding that Arizona’s E-Verify requirement for employers was not
preempted because it accorded with congressional intent).
159
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
261 (1993) (“Before the twentieth century, criminal justice was overwhelmingly the
business of the states, not the federal government.”).
160
See Stumpf, supra note 145, at 1587, 1608 (noting the phenomenon and arguing that such deference is undesirable when the goal of the criminal statute is to enforce immigration law indirectly).
161
See Chacón, supra note 121, at 1579-92.
162
See id. at 1598-1615.
163
See id. at 1615-19.
164
As of August 2009, forty-three states had enacted criminal and civil laws targeting human trafficking. Melynda H. Barnhart, Sex and Slavery: An Analysis of Three Models of State Human Trafficking Legislation, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 83, 87 (2009);
see also ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.360 (2008) (enacted 2006) (criminalizing sex and labor
trafficking); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1307 (Supp. 2008) (enacted 2005) (criminalizing sex trafficking); id. § 13-1308 (enacted 2005) (criminalizing labor trafficking); ARK.
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CODE ANN. § 5-11-108 (2006) (enacted 2005) (criminalizing trafficking); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 52.5 (West 2008) (creating a private right of action for human trafficking victims); CAL. PENAL CODE § 236.1 (West 2008 & Supp. 2009) (criminalizing trafficking);
id. § 236.2 (providing additional protection for trafficking victims); id. § 236.5 (describing law enforcement obligations to identify victims of human trafficking); id.
§ 266k (providing programming for child victims); id. § 273.7 (penalizing disclosure of
the location of a trafficking shelter); id. § 293 (forbidding law enforcement agents
from disclosing the personal information of trafficking victims); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-6-402 (2008) (enacted 1977) (criminalizing child trafficking); id. § 18-13-127
(enacted 2006) (criminalizing trafficking in adults); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571i
(West 2007 & Supp. 2009) (enacted 2006) (creating a civil private cause of action); id.
§ 53a-192a (enacted 2006) (criminalizing trafficking); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 787
(2007) (enacted 2007) (criminalizing trafficking); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 772.104 (West
2007) (creating a private right of action for trafficking victims); id. § 787.05 (West
2007) (enacted 2004) (criminalizing forced labor); id. § 787.06 (finding human trafficking to be a “modern day” form of slavery); id. § 16-5-46 (enacted 2006) (criminalizing trafficking); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8602 (Supp. 2008) (enacted 2006) (defining
human trafficking); id. § 18-8603 (criminalizing human trafficking); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/10-9 (2010) (enacted 2009) (criminalizing trafficking); IND. CODE ANN. § 3542-3.5-1 (West Supp. 2008) (enacted 2006) (criminalizing trafficking); id. § 35-42-3.5-2
(enacted 2006) (providing that a court may order that restitution be paid to a victim of
trafficking); id. § 35-42-3.5-3 (enacted 2006) (creating a civil private right of action);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 710A.1–.5 (West Supp. 2009) (enacted 2006) (defining trafficking
and providing restitution for victims and an affirmative defense for alleged perpetrators); id. § 915.51 (enacted 2006) (providing protection of victims regardless of immigration status); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3446 (2007) (enacted 2005) (criminalizing trafficking); id. § 21-3447 (enacted 2005) (criminalizing aggravated trafficking); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 529.100 (LexisNexis 2008) (enacted 2007) (criminalizing trafficking); id.
§ 529.110 (enacted 2007) (criminalizing “promoting human trafficking”); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:46.2 (2007) (criminalizing trafficking); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,
§ 4701 (Supp. 2008) (enacted 2007) (defining and criminalizing human trafficking
and creating a civil private right of action); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 11-303 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008) (enacted 2007) (criminalizing trafficking); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 750.462b–.462i (West Supp. 2009) (enacted 2006) (criminalizing trafficking);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.281–.283 (West 2009) (enacted 2005) (criminalizing trafficking); id. § 609.284 (enacted 2005) (creating civil liability for trafficking); id.
§§ 609.321–.322 (amended 2005 to include sex trafficking) (including sex trafficking
in a statute penalizing prostitution); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-54 to -54.4 (West Supp.
2008) (enacted 2006) (criminalizing trafficking); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.206 (West
Supp. 2009) (enacted 2004) (criminalizing trafficking); id. § 566.209 (enacted 2004)
(criminalizing sex trafficking); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.212–.213 (West Supp. 2009)
(enacted 2004) (criminalizing child sex trafficking); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-306
(2007) (enacted 2007) (criminalizing trafficking); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-830 to -832
(2008) (enacted 2006) (criminalizing trafficking); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.467–
.468 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007) (enacted 2007) (criminalizing trafficking); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 633:6–:10 (2010) (enacted 2009) (criminalizing trafficking and establishing penalties); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-8 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009) (enacted 2005)
(criminalizing trafficking); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-52-1 (LexisNexis 2009) (enacted
2008) (criminalizing trafficking); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.35 (McKinney 2009) (enacted
2007) (defining labor trafficking); id. § 230.34 (enacted 2007) (criminalizing sex trafficking); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-43.10–.13 (2007) (enacted 2006) (defining and criminalizing labor and sex trafficking); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-40-01 to -02 (2010)
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of the positive antitrafficking activism spurred at both the international and domestic level by the Palermo Protocol and the TVPA. But the
bills were also affected by the anti-immigrant climate in which many of
165
Consequently, the bills some state legislatures
them were passed.
passed address trafficking only as part of a broader effort to insert
state law enforcement and other regulators into the business of pu166
nishing migrants and regulating migration.
(enacted 2009) (defining and criminalizing trafficking); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 748 (West Supp. 2009) (enacted 2008) (criminalizing trafficking); id. tit. 21, § 748.2
(enacted 2008) (creating guidelines for human trafficking victims); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 30.867 (2007) (enacted 2007) (creating a civil private right of action for trafficking
victims); id. § 163.266 (enacted 2007) (criminalizing trafficking); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 3001–3004 (Supp. 2008) (enacted 2006) (criminalizing trafficking and authorizing
restitution and forfeiture); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-67-1 to -5 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008)
(enacted 2007) (criminalizing trafficking and authorizing restitution and forfeiture);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-930 (West Supp. 2008) (enacted 2006) (criminalizing trafficking); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-307 to -311 (2009) (enacted 2008) (criminalizing trafficking and providing restitution); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 98.001–.006
(Vernon Supp. 2009) (enacted 2009) (creating civil remedies for trafficking); TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 402.035 (Vernon Supp. 2009) (enacted 2009) (creating a human
trafficking prevention task force); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 20A.01–.02 (Vernon
Supp. 2009) (enacted 2003) (criminalizing trafficking); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-307
to -310 (2008) (enacted 2008) (criminalizing trafficking); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 7.68.350 (West 2009) (enacted 2003) (creating a task force against human trafficking); id. § 7.68.360 (enacted 2005) (mandating coordination of state agency protocols); id. § 9A.40.100 (enacted 2003) (criminalizing trafficking); id. § 19.320.020
(enacted 2009) (requiring disclosure to foreign laborers regarding working conditions
and legal entitlements); id. § 19.320.030 (enacted 2009) (creating jurisdiction over international recruitment agents); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.302 (West Supp. 2008)
(enacted 2007) (criminalizing trafficking); id. § 948.051 (enacted 2007) (criminalizing
child trafficking).
165
See, e.g., George A. Martínez, Immigration: Deportation and the Psuedo-Science of
Unassimilable Peoples, 61 SMU L. REV. 7, 8 (2008) (detailing local efforts to enforce deportation on the basis of federal laws); Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton! “Illegal” Immigrants Beware: Local Immigration Ordinances and What the Federal Government
Must Do About It, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 3-4 (2007) (chronicling local ordinances that
discriminate against immigrants); Olivas, supra note 145, at 32 (discussing “restrictionist” anti-immigration state statutes); Huyen Pham, Problems Facing the First Generation of
Local Immigration Laws, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1303, 1303 (2008) (citing a Colorado law
that required proof of immigration status before receiving benefits).
166
See, e.g., Georgia Security and Immigration Compliance Act, 2006 GA. LAWS 105
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 13, 16, 35, 42, 43, 48 & 50 GA. CODE
ANN.) (enacting antitrafficking laws as part of a very restrictive immigration bill); Jim
Tharpe & Carlos Campos, Legislature 2006: House Passes Bill on Illegals; Senate Prepares to
Iron Out Differences, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 24, 2006, at 1A (characterizing the bill as
an effort by the Georgia legislature to “confront illegal immigration”); see also MO.
ANN. STAT. § 577.675 (West Supp. 2009) (enacted 2008) (criminalizing the “trafficking” of “any illegal alien who is not lawfully present,” suggesting that the law may function chiefly as an antismuggling provision in cases involving noncitizens). In Maricopa
County, Arizona, Sheriff Joe Arpaio, who has been engaged in a controversial law en-
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At the moment, there is very little evidence regarding how these
laws will be deployed in the forty-eight states where they have been
167
Some states, like California, seem interested in expanding
enacted.
their laws to help migrants by protecting victims regardless of citizen168
ship status and spotlighting exploitative labor practices.
In other
states, antitrafficking measures have passed in forms that suggest that
officials’ true concern is to provide law enforcement with additional
tools to curb unauthorized migration. For the reasons discussed above,
it is tremendously important to bring pressure to bear to ensure that
state law enforcement agencies use their antitrafficking laws to curb exploitation rather than to promote the criminalization of immigration.
CONCLUSION
A vast number of the world’s citizens are displaced as a result of
poverty, lack of opportunity, the ravages of armed conflict, or the
dangers of political repression. This population is particularly vulnerable to exploitation by those who help them to cross international
borders, as well as those in whose care or employment they find themselves upon arrival on the other side of the border.
The legal tools states use to manage migration across state borders
increase this marginalization. Unless a person can establish her qualifications as a refugee or fit the narrow criteria for legal entrants, she
undertakes border crossing in violation of the law and is then confronted with the harsh penalties that states increasingly attach to violations of their border-control measures. Traffickers know this. They
take advantage of the legal and social marginalization of migrants in
order to profit from their exploitation. This harm is different from
the harms created by the smuggler; though he certainly profits from
violations of state sovereignty, he also extracts a price from the migrant that does not rise to the level of enslavement, indentured servitude, forced prostitution, or debt bondage. The line is not always
forcement “crusade” against illegal immigration for the past few years, has posted signs
on official vehicles that read, “Help Sheriff Joe Arpaio fight illegal immigration and
trafficking. Call 602.876.4154 with any info/tips on illegal aliens.” Terry Carter, The
Maricopa County Courthouse War, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2010, at 42, 46-47.
167
See supra notes 92-93 (describing the relatively scant case law under state antitrafficking laws to date).
168
On September 8, 2009, Governor Schwarzenegger signed into law a bill that
requires law enforcement agents to identify trafficking victims diligently regardless of
citizenship. The bill also expands privacy protections for trafficking victims by allowing
them to request that their names be kept out of the public records. CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 6254 (West 2008); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 236.2, 293 (West Supp. 2009).

2010]

Tensions and Trade-offs

1651

clear, but where exploitation permeates the relationship between the
smuggler and the smuggled, or between the migrant and her employer, the line is undoubtedly crossed.
The TVPA provides one tool to address the needs of those who
have been preyed upon by those who cross the line. Overall, that tool
169
has been useful. Like the benefits of U.S. refugee and asylum law, it
does not help all who technically qualify for assistance. Only those
victims of trafficking who are in the United States are able to avail
themselves of the protections and benefits of the TVPA. Moreover,
for such individuals, this protection is only provided if the state deems
their conditions to be sufficiently exploitative to rise to the level of
“severe” forms of trafficking. Even then, it is only granted if the person complies with the demands of the legal system or presents a reason for noncompliance. In short, it is not a broadly available remedy.
Individuals who come forward under the current system to claim
protection as victims of trafficking face the real possibility that the
170
government will not find them eligible for such protection.
Yet,
without protection, those individuals will be subject to deportation—
the clear prerogative of the state enforcing its immigration and other
criminal laws. The victim in the gray area faces a hard choice.
There are at least two options to improve the plight of the migrant
in the gray area. The first is to expand the legal understanding of the
kinds of coercive situations that constitute trafficking to encompass
more of the exploitative situations that migrants face in an era of unprecedented immigration enforcement. The danger of this approach
is that it is likely to prove unpopular with policymakers who seek to
decrease incentives for illegal migration. Such lawmakers have criti-

169

The President is authorized to set an annual cap for the admission of overseas
refugees. 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2006). Although the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees estimates that, in 2008, there were 15.2 million refugees worldwide, only
about 60,000 of those refugees were resettled in the United States that year. UNITED
NATIONS REFUGEE AGENCY, 2008 GLOBAL TRENDS: REFUGEES, ASYLUM-SEEKERS, RETURNEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED AND STATELESS PEOPLE 2, 12 (2009), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/4a375c426.html. Political asylum is also available to refugees
who are “physically present in the United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1158, but this form of relief
was granted only to about 22,000 more individuals in 2008. DANIEL C. MARTIN & MICHAEL HOEFER, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2008, at 5 (2009),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_rfa_fr_2008.pdf.
170
For an overview of the number of T visa petitions denied over the past 5 years,
see ATT’Y GEN. 2008 TRAFFICKING REPORT, supra note 22, at 35.
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cized an expansive approach as a means of rewarding migrants who
171
deliberately violate the law to cross borders.
The second option is to reexamine policies that do little to enhance border protection but increase the marginalization of all migrants, including trafficking victims. Eliminating the routine criminal
prosecutions of illegal entrants along the southern border, working to
identify, shame, and prosecute employers (and consumers) who profit
from exploited labor forces, and applying National Labor Relations
Act backpay remedies to all workers regardless of citizenship are all
ways to improve the general status of migrants and increase protection
for workers without creating perverse incentives to migrate unlawfully.
The degree to which antitrafficking rhetoric can be used in ways
that cut against these goals, rather than promote them, is troubling.
By fueling the image of the migrant as a criminal, antitrafficking rhetoric compounds the myth of migrant criminality. If migrants are
perceived as dangerous criminals, the routine prosecutions of misdemeanor illegal entry seem like a logical and desirable border-security
measure. A criminalized population is unlikely to garner sympathy
when it is subject to exploitation in the workplace, thus rendering impossible the goals of collectively condemning unscrupulous employers
and providing workplace remedies for the migrants abused by those
employers. Once the issue has been framed as a problem of migrant
criminals, then the most obvious—and the most frequently promoted—solution is to increase border controls and criminal enforcement of immigration law.
Antitrafficking policies have to start not with border control but
with an effort to eliminate the marginalization that generates exploita172
tion. For this to happen, the discourse around trafficking needs to
change. Enforcement officers at the highest levels need to pay more
attention to how the problem of trafficking is characterized and how
agents are trained to solve it. Advocates of antitrafficking measures
need to be careful about how they characterize the problem of traf171

See Chacón, supra note 10, at 3022 (discussing TVPA’s limited definition of trafficking in light of protecting victims who “consented” to some aspect of their transportation across borders).
172
The relatively narrow recommendations set forth in this Article do not constitute a call for open borders, although some scholars have urged that this is the best
way to eradicate not only trafficking but a whole host of other social ills. See, e.g.,
JOHNSON, supra note 138; cf. Bravo, Free Labor!, supra note 1, at 616 (urging a liberalized labor regime, which is a more modest version of the open-borders proposal); Gallagher, supra note 1, at 833-34 (arguing that trafficking is an inevitable byproduct of
closed borders, but conceding that borders will be closed for the foreseeable future).
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ficking when they push for antitrafficking measures at the state and
local levels or propose reforms at the national and international levels. Inaccurate assumptions about migrant criminality and border
security plague antitrafficking discussions. Rooting those assumptions
out of the discourse is a starting point for moving the national (and
international) conversation in a direction that will allow for the creation of antitrafficking strategies that do not have the perverse effect of
fueling the marginalization that lies at the heart of trafficking.

